Posts Tagged ‘ Banking ’

Making the Interest Rate Interesting

Wednesday, January 6th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

As we head into the new year, one of the biggest questions facing the economy is: “Whither the interest rate?” This number is set by the Federal Open Market Committee and its targeting of the fed funds rate – or the rate at which banks lend funds to each other – is currently effectively zero (technically in a range from zero to 0.25 percent). It’s been there for just over a year, and is likely going to stay there for the better part of 2010 (if I could tell you when, I wouldn’t be here – I’d be lighting cigars with hundred-dollar bills some place much warmer).

Despite its provenance as a dry economic term, the interest rate is interesting. It’s a fundamental piece of how our economy works. It determines everything, from how likely you are to get a loan or a mortgage (ceteris paribus – as the economists like to say – the lower the rate, the more lending that is done), to how likely we’re going to have inflation (high interest rates head off inflation, ceteris paribus), to how much a dollar is worth (a higher interest rate relative to overseas rates means it’ll be worth more, cete- you get the idea), to how fast the economy will grow (higher interest rates mean slower growth). It is usually the most powerful tool in any central banker’s toolbox, and certainly the one that’s most often used.

In addition to its central role in the economy, the interest rate is interesting for two other reasons these days.

First, there is the discussion of where the interest rate should be for recovery. There’s a good rule of thumb to determine what the ideal interest rate is: the Taylor rule. Very briefly put, the Taylor rule takes the inflation rate and the unemployment rate and uses them to compute what the ideal interest rate should be (check out the San Francisco Fed for more info). According to some Fed research last spring, the Taylor rule says that interest rates should be at -5 percent (that’s negative five percent – as unemployment is 1.5 percent higher now, the Taylor rule would say the rate now should be even lower).

The problem with negative interest rates is that while they’re technically feasible, they really discourage lending (would you give me a dollar today if I promised you ninety cents next Tuesday?). More realistically, negative real interest rates are possible if you encourage inflation. But inflation eats away at economic growth – ask Zimbabwe – and the “inflation tax” of high inflation falls disproportionately on the poor.

But inflation hawks have been arguing for the Fed to raise rates for a couple of months – to two percent. These hawks tend to be strongly laisse faire conservatives, One of the voices saying we should ignore the Taylor rule is – as Brad DeLong points out – the man who invented it himself, Stanford University’s (and Bush Treasury appointee) John Taylor.

Secondly, as the old saying goes: when the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem begins to look like a nail. Interest rates, while powerful, cannot solve every economic problem. The Taylor rule tells us we shouldn’t raise the interest rate, we can’t lower the interest rate, and no one is happy where the economy is now. At a time when the interest rate is at zero, and should be negative, alternatives need to be explored. As Clive Crook says in his latest column:

Interest rates that take into account asset prices as well as general inflation are part of this, of course. But when it comes to financial regulation, the key thing is rules that recognise the credit cycle, and change as it proceeds. Most important, as argued by Charles Goodhart in these pages, capital and liquidity requirements should be time-varying and strongly anti-cyclical. In good times, when lending is expanding quickly and financial institutions’ concerns about capital and liquidity are at their least, the requirements should tighten. Under current rules, they do the opposite.

Crook is right that unusually low capital ratios (and their counterparts – high leverage ratios) were a catalyst of last year’s crisis. Now that we need to get the economy going again, banks need to lend. One way to do so would be to lower capital ratios (if it wouldn’t bring the solvency of some large banks into question). As part of a regulatory reform package, policymakers should pursue a counter-cyclical capital requirements policy.

They should also expand who has to follow capital requirements. As currently defined, only depository institutions and not investment banks – such as Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch were, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley used to be – are required to follow the Fed’s Board of Governor’s capital requirements. Getting other financial institutions to respond to capital requirements will make that a much more powerful tool.

Breaking the Glass-Steagall Myth

Friday, December 18th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Bank of America Tower, Seattle, WAWord going around Washington this week is that Sens. John McCain (R-AZ) and Maria Cantwell (D-WA) are pushing to reinstate Glass-Steagall:

McCain and Cantwell, a Washington Democrat, join other lawmakers in Congress proposing to reinstate the 1933 law, repealed a decade ago by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that led to a rise in conglomerates including Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. active in retail banking, insurance and proprietary trading. Legislation to reinstate the ban was introduced today in the House.

While this move is a well-meaning attempt to rein in the financial sector, it doesn’t address the issues that caused last fall’s crisis.

Glass-Steagall was aimed at separating “boring” retail banking (the Bailey Building and Loan Association, for example) from “risky” investment bankers (Gordon Gekko). It was eventually repealed, as U.S. banks felt it put them at a disadvantage in the global marketplace against European “universal” banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and HSBC.

At the time there was concern that repealing Glass-Steagall would create banks that were systematically dangerous. In hindsight, that concern would seem to be born out — but it isn’t. After all, the three major bank collapses that precipitated the crisis were Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. All three were obviously Too Big Too Fail, but all three would have been unaffected by a reinstatement of Glass-Steagall — none of them is a retail bank (this is why you never saw Merrill or Lehman ATMs).

Rather than focusing on micromanaging bank structure, and stifling entrepreneurship in the financial sector, the Senators would be better served by evaluating different options to limit the size of Too Big Too Fail banks. A smarter idea would be to extend the retail bank deposits cap idea to total bank assets. Currently, no bank can have more than 10 percent of total national retail deposits (Bank of America got a waiver for the 2007 purchase of Chicagoland’s LaSalle bank and now has 12.2 percent of national deposits). Peter Boone and Simon Johnson suggest applying this simple principle to total bank liabilities. They recommend a limit of 2 percent of GDP, which is in line with the $300 billion that Felix Salmon has been recommending since March. Importantly, it’s also in line with the de facto $100 billion threshold that bank regulators are using now.

This way the government isn’t running banks and bankers can pursue the capitalist impulse that drives our economy. But with a cap on liabilities, the decisions of bankers cannot threaten our economy like they have in the past.

Left-Right Convergence?

Wednesday, December 16th, 2009
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

The latest intra-progressive dustup over health care reform displays a couple of pretty important potential fault lines within the American center-left. One has to do with political strategy, and the role of the Democratic Party and the presidency in promoting progressive policy goals and social movements. I’ll be writing about that subject extensively in the coming days.

But the other potential fault line is ideological, and is sometimes hard to discern because it extends across a variety of issues. To put it simply, and perhaps over-simply, on a variety of fronts (most notably financial restructuring and health care reform, but arguably on climate change as well), the Obama administration has chosen the strategy of deploying regulated and subsidized private sector entities to achieve progressive policy results. This approach was a hallmark of the so-called Clintonian, “New Democrat” movement, and the broader international movement sometimes referred to as “the Third Way,” which often defended the use of private means for public ends. (It’s also arguably central to the American liberal tradition going back to Woodrow Wilson, and is even evident in parts of the New Deal and Great Society initiatives alongside elements of the “social democratic” tradition, which is characterized by support for publicly operated programs in key areas.)

To be clear, this is not the same as the conservative “privatization” strategy, which simply devolves public responsibilities to private entities without much in the way of regulation. In education policy, to cite one example, New Democrats (and the Obama administration) have championed charter public schools, which are highly regulated but privately operated schools that receive public funds in exchange for successful performance of publicly-defined tasks. Conservatives have typically called for private-school vouchers, which simply shift public funds to private schools more or less unconditionally, on the theory that they know best how to educate children.

Now clear as this distinction seems to “New Democrats,” there are a considerable number of progressives who think it’s largely a distinction without a difference, in education policy and elsewhere. And we are seeing that fundamental divergence on opinion on other, more prominent issues right now. On the financial front, the Obama administration reflexively pursued a strategy of regulation and subsidies for the financial sector, without modifying the fundamental nature of financial institutions, even as critics on the left argued for nationalization (at least temporarily) of key financial functions. At the more popular level, critics of TARP from the left joined critics of TARP from the right in deploring “bailouts” of failed financial institutions, even though the two groups of critics held vastly different views of the right alternative course of action.

Similarly in the health care reform debate, the Obama administration pursued legislation that utilized regulated and subsidized private for-profit health insurers to achieve universal health coverage. This approach was inherently flawed to “single-payer” advocates on the left, who strongly believe that private for-profit health insurers are the main problem in the U.S. health care system. The difference was for a long time papered over by the cleverly devised “public option,” which was acceptable to many New Democrat types as a way of ensuring robust competition among private insurers, and which became crucial to single-payer advocates who viewed it as a way to gradually introduce a superior, publicly-operated form of health insurance to those not covered by existing public programs like Medicare and Medicaid. (That’s why the effort to substitute a Medicare buy-in for the public option, which Joe Lieberman killed this week, received such a strong positive response from many progressives whose ultimate goal is an expansion of Medicare-style coverage to all Americans).

Now that the public option compromise is apparently no longer on the table, and there’s no Medicare buy-in to offer single-payer advocates an alternative path to the kind of system they favor, it’s hardly surprising that some progressives have gone into open opposition, and are using the kind of outraged and categorical language deployed by Marcy Wheeler yesterday. As with the financial issue, there’s now a tactical alliance between conservative critics of “ObamaCare,” who view the regulation and subsidization of private health insurers as “socialism,” and progressive critics of the legislation who view the same features as representing “neo-feudalism.”

To put it more bluntly, on a widening range of issues, Obama’s critics to the right say he’s engineering a government takeover of the private sector, while his critics to the left accuse him of promoting a corporate takeover of the public sector. They can’t both be right, of course, and these critics would take the country in completely different directions if given a chance. But the tactical convergence is there if they choose to pursue it.

For those of us whose primary interest is progressive unity and political success for the Democratic Party, it’s very tempting to downplay or even ignore this potential fault-line and the left-right convergence it makes possible. It’s also easy to dismiss critics-from-the-left of Obama as people primarily interested in long-range movement-building rather than short-term political success; that’s true for some of them. But sorting out these differences in ideology and perspective is, in my opinion, essential to the progressive political project. And with a rejuvenated and increasingly radical right’s hounds baying and sniffing at the doors of the Capitol, we don’t have the time or energy to spare in dialogues of the deaf wherein we call each other names while getting ready for the elections of 2010 and 2012.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

A Game Plan for Infrastructure

Thursday, December 10th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

A Game Plan for InfrastructureIt’s a sign of the times when “our bridges and roads are falling apart” gets cited as an issue more pressing than college football’s annoying Bowl Championship Series (BCS) on ESPN.

And, while the president hasn’t fulfilled his promise to set up an eight-team playoff yet, he’s taken the issue of infrastructure head-on. The administration’s focus on infrastructure investment is good for both long-term growth and generating jobs through the quick start-up of “shovel ready” projects.

However, one-time disbursements like those outlined in the Recovery Act or the president’s announcement earlier this week fall short of fixing more fundamental issues.

On the heels of Obama’s speech at Brookings on Tuesday, Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN) is at the same venue today pushing a much more sustainable approach.

Ellison is a co-sponsor on Rep. Rosa DeLauro’s (D-CT) National Infrastructure Development Bank Act, a good start on developing sustainable infrastructure funding the country so desperately needs.

DeLauro and and Ellison’s bill builds on the work of a bipartisan commission chaired by former Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH) and titan of finance Felix Rohatyn. The bill envisions $5 billion a year from the federal government to capitalize the bank and a government debt guarantee of up to $50 billion.

But even Ellison and DeLauro’s idea can be improved upon. As outlined in Jessica Milano’s PPI policy memo, “Building our 21st Century Infrastructure,” an American Infrastructure Bank (AIB) seeded with a one-time investment at the federal level — a potential use for the TARP funds the president announced this week — and stakeholder buy-ins from the states would be a more effective way to fund a bank dedicated to financing infrastructure programs.

An infrastructure bank would offer a way to leverage much larger private sector investments from a strapped public budget. The bank would raise inexpensive funding for infrastructure projects by issuing debt on the capital markets backed by the U.S. government’s credit rating. By backing these bonds with the revenue or assets of the projects they are financing, taxpayers would not be left to pick up the bill. These projects would be determined according to strict criteria that promote economic development while being fiscally and environmentally sound.

After the President’s remarks on Tuesday, Gov. Ed Rendell of Pennsylvania — an infrastructure bank supporter — said the president had “essentially” endorsed the idea of an AIB. But while the president sounded open to the idea this week, he hasn’t gotten behind the legislation needed to get it done. President Obama endorsed an infrastructure bank back when he was candidate Obama. But, much like his promise of reforming the BCS, this threatens to become another campaign promise that falls by the wayside. Now’s the moment for the president to come off the sidelines and lead a sustained drive down the field.

Some Unanswered Questions on Financial Reform

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA)-authored Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed the House Financial Services Committee last Wednesday, and could come to a floor vote in the House as soon as this week. Through legislative jujitsu on Frank’s part, the bill will have a lead on Sen. Chris Dodd’s (D-CT) efforts in the Senate.

The day after the committee passed the legislation, I saw Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) talk about it at an event hosted by the National Journal and got to exchange a few words with him on the subject. He was positive about the bill and its chances in the House (it will likely pass easily), and gave positive marks to the administration’s handling of the crisis in its first year in office.

But while Perlmutter said he felt the House has done its part to address regulatory reforms, I thought some of the accomplishments he touted leave unanswered fundamental questions raised by the financial crisis.

He spoke about the legislation’s planned Financial Stability Council, that would provide a forum for regulators like the Fed to address systemic risk. But the Financial Stability Council, instead of facilitating coordination among regulators, won’t live up to expectations — much like what happened with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that was supposed to facilitate information-sharing in the intelligence sector, but has had limited effectiveness in getting different agencies to talk to each other. The weak mandate of a Financial Stability Council would lead to regulator shopping by financial institutions, a temptation that can lead to problems similar to those seen in the case of under-regulated AIG. Moreover, the resolution authority that the council would have is useful only after the fact — it would not preemptively deal with the Too Big To Fail problem we still face.

Fixing Mark-to-Market Requirements

More generally, however, Perlmutter mentioned two ideas the House is considering that could actually contain the seeds of our next crisis.

One idea is extending the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) loosening of mark-to-market requirements for financial institutions to value their securities. Perlmutter wants to suspend mark-to-market and make permanent the FASB’s contentious April decision to ease mark-to-market rules.

The rule would let the Financial Stability Council order FASB to suspend mark-to-market in cases where there is no market in a security or securities are being sold in a “fire sale” or distressed environment. More worrisome, however, is that banks get to declare whether the market in the securities they are holding is distressed or not. Banks can drive a truckload of bad investment decisions through this loophole without having to disclose them on their bottom line or affecting capital requirements. Under this new rule, banks will have no incentive to conduct diligent analysis of the securities they hold — anything that turns out to be worthless (like bonds backed by subprime loans) can just be called “distressed.” This would decrease transparency and not restore confidence to the system.

But mark-to-market does have the bad consequence of increasing volatility in bank balance sheets. During crises like last year’s, banks can even perversely see mark-to-market improve their bottom line the closer they get to bankruptcy.

A better idea than the one Perlmutter mentioned has been put forward by PPI contributor Robert Pozen in his new book, Too Big To Save. Pozen suggests delinking banking capital regulations from accounting mark-to-market rules by effectively recognizing all securities as being “held for sale” (an accounting distinction) for regulatory purposes. This would allow us to continue to keep the transparency in assets that mark-to-market allows, while avoiding the bottom line volatility that banks would like to avoid.

What to Do About Sarbanes-Oxley

The second idea is exempting firms from some Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) reporting requirements. Passed in the wake of Enron, SOX was designed to hold companies and their executives accountable for their auditing, and eliminate some glaring conflicts of interest in financial auditing.

SOX does two good things. It makes a publicly held company have legitimate auditors, and ensures that those same auditors aren’t also advising the company on how to prepare the books for auditing (thereby basically handing over the answer key before a test). SOX also made sure that companies had proper controls that minimized the risk of errors in financial statements and of people either using company money inappropriately (as Enron did in off-balance-sheet shell companies) and of people embezzling money. Exempting firms from this would eventually lead to the same bad behavior happening again.

That said, SOX isn’t without flaws. Many in the auditing industry perceive it as very manpower intensive and, as a result, a significant burden to publicly listed companies, especially smaller ones (with income under $100 million). The SEC has responded by annually exempting small companies from some reporting requirements, but the exemption is not going to be extended past next year.

The solution to this problem is to streamline SOX to make it less burdensome to companies, not gutting it and letting new Enrons bubble up. Instead of providing an internal control report with each annual filing to the SEC — which can require up to three percent of a small company’s income — the SEC and Congress should encourage accounting oversight boards to spell out further guidelines and best practices to adopt. This streamlined SOX could even be extended to non-public financial institutions, as a key part of what allowed Bernie Madoff to steal people’s money for so long was having a small one-man upstate auditor keep tabs on his multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.

Too Big to Run

Thursday, December 3rd, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

In discussions about the dismal state of the economy, the existence of “too big to fail” institutions has emerged as a recurring cause for concern. In particular, Bank of America and Citigroup (the first and third largest banks in the country, respectively) are firms whose size makes them an “existential threat” to the well-being of the economy.

(Bank #2 in size is JPMorgan, whose chief, Jamie Dimon, has been going around saying that we can end “too big to fail” without capping the size of financial institutions by providing regulators with resolution authority over banks — the ability to wind them down in an orderly fashion. While resolution authority can help in cases — like Lehman’s — where banks become insolvent, these after-the-fact measures would not prevent the liquidity crisis that selling against a too-big-to-fail institution would cause.)

While Citigroup has made efforts to break itself up, including selling off its half of the Smith Barney joint venture with Morgan Stanley, Bank of America under Ken Lewis has been resistant to downsizing, adamant that clients benefit from its size. But with the embattled Lewis having announced he will step down at the end of the year, the bank is looking for a new chief.

And that search has run up against a problem — not only are these firms seen as “too big to fail,” they’re also too big to run:

At least two candidates for the top job at Bank of America Corp. told directors that the giant bank should consider breaking itself up… [One candidate, former Bank of Hawaii CEO Michael O'Neill] recently told the Bank of America search committee that the bank’s risk-adjusted capital wasn’t being used productively. He added that the company should become simpler and less prone to volatility

How big is Bank of America? With over $2.25 trillion in assets, it has a pervasive presence in our economy. The numbers from the Wall Street Journal are staggering:

Bank of America is the largest U.S. bank by assets and has 6,000 branches, 18,000 automated-teller machines and relationships with 53 million households, or roughly one out of every two households in the U.S.

Whereas the mantra “bigger is better” was applied to the financial industry over the past 20 years, there is now a reassessment of that idea. But instead of providing clear guidance on how to get financial institutions to a more reasonable size (and, indeed, what that size is), the government is sending unclear signals, with conflicting announcements on which companies it is willing to bail out and tepid additional reporting requirements that won’t rein in outsized firms.

Rather than add to the uncertainty, the administration should come out with guidelines on how it proposes to solve the “too big to fail” problem. Whether through voluntary break-up of banks it has a stake in, anti-trust measures, or by instituting a too-big-to-fail tax, the administration should lay out clear rules for banks to follow. This will allow big banks to stop chasing their tails on executive decisions — like Bank of America is doing — and get back to business.

Wall Street’s Bonus Problem

Friday, November 20th, 2009
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

For all of pay czar Kenneth Feinberg’s efforts, bonuses on Wall Street show no signs of slowing. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan Chase & Co. (all of which have paid back their TARP obligations) are reportedly paying $30 billion in bonuses this year.

There is a very simple reason that people on Wall Street are making so much money and will continue to do so, no matter what pay cuts are imposed. It is because there is still so much money to be made.

Over the last few decades, the too-smart-for-their-own-good set on Wall Street has become incredibly good at using money to make money through a devil’s dictionary of obscure trading strategies, as well as a rough fee structure for clients. In both areas, they have taken advantage of lax regulation and even laxer enforcement.

Consider: In the 2000s, the finance sector accounted for an absurdly high 41 percent of domestic corporate profits. Between 1973 and 1985, it never accounted for more than 16 percent; it has risen steadily since. In other words: an absurd amount of the wealth in this country is going to the bankers.

As long as this is the case, bonuses will continue to be absurd. Pay is a consequence of this distended economy-wide profit pie, not a cause. As long as there is money on the table (and there is), the clever folks in investment banking and hedge funds will find a way to make sure they’re the ones pocketing it.

The financial services regulation moving through the House and Senate will take some of this money off the table (though probably not enough), and may close some opportunities for making money out of the global economy through gouging and speculation (though, as I suggested in an earlier post, a financial transaction tax would make this more effective). But the important thing is that a Wall Street with a smaller place in the economy is also a Wall Street that will simply have less to pay its people.

The Real Reason to Support a Financial Transaction Tax

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

Thanks to Gordon Brown’s support, the idea of a financial transaction tax has been gaining a bit of attention over the last couple of weeks. The idea is simple: place a small tax (say, 0.25 percent or less) on all financial transactions.

Partially, it’s a way to raise a little revenue from those who can most afford to pay to create an insurance fund against future bailouts, which is how it is being billed. And just yesterday, it was reported that House Democrats have discussed using it to fund a jobs bill. (Dean Baker has estimated that the tax could bring in $100 billion.)

But mostly, it’s a good idea because it throws a little sand in the gears of the giant financial speculation casino.

Wall Street banks make a good deal of money by running very sophisticated computer programs, looking for tiny (and supposedly risk-free) arbitraging opportunities, and then making those opportunities pay off by investing with incredibly high volume. These trades are something like the equivalent of buying a bunch of dollars for 99.75 cents each. It’s a great deal if you can do it en masse, and an even better deal if you can also borrow almost all of the money you are investing.

But if banks had to pay a 0.25 percent tax on every dollar they sold, then it suddenly wouldn’t seem like such a good deal to buy dollars for 99.75 cents each. This is what a transaction tax would do.

This would mean that Wall Street banks would spend less time looking for short-term opportunities to buy dollar bills for 99.75 cents. This a good thing, because it’s hard to see how having some of the smartest people and most sophisticated computer programs dedicated to this kind activity helps the economy. Something is wrong when 40 percent of all U.S. corporate profits are coming from the financial sector, as they were for much of the 2000s.

A transaction tax would mean that banks would instead devote more time to investing their capital in good, long-term investments. This seems to me what a banking sector is supposed to do — allocate capital to the most promising business ventures, which then sometimes actually spur innovation and improve the standard of living for everyone, not just those who happen to be clever enough to take part in the big casino.

Unfortunately, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is against such a tax, and his support is pretty important, since any transaction tax would require an international agreement. This is not surprising, since Geithner is and always will be a creature of Wall Street.

Still, it’s hard not to marvel at the latest round of bonuses on Wall Street and wonder how it is that these guys are making $30 billion while the economy continues to stumble. Slowing down the Wall Street speculation machine might help channel some energy elsewhere — maybe into actual productive recovery.