Posts Tagged ‘ Financial reform ’

Breaking the Glass-Steagall Myth

Friday, December 18th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Bank of America Tower, Seattle, WAWord going around Washington this week is that Sens. John McCain (R-AZ) and Maria Cantwell (D-WA) are pushing to reinstate Glass-Steagall:

McCain and Cantwell, a Washington Democrat, join other lawmakers in Congress proposing to reinstate the 1933 law, repealed a decade ago by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that led to a rise in conglomerates including Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. active in retail banking, insurance and proprietary trading. Legislation to reinstate the ban was introduced today in the House.

While this move is a well-meaning attempt to rein in the financial sector, it doesn’t address the issues that caused last fall’s crisis.

Glass-Steagall was aimed at separating “boring” retail banking (the Bailey Building and Loan Association, for example) from “risky” investment bankers (Gordon Gekko). It was eventually repealed, as U.S. banks felt it put them at a disadvantage in the global marketplace against European “universal” banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and HSBC.

At the time there was concern that repealing Glass-Steagall would create banks that were systematically dangerous. In hindsight, that concern would seem to be born out — but it isn’t. After all, the three major bank collapses that precipitated the crisis were Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. All three were obviously Too Big Too Fail, but all three would have been unaffected by a reinstatement of Glass-Steagall — none of them is a retail bank (this is why you never saw Merrill or Lehman ATMs).

Rather than focusing on micromanaging bank structure, and stifling entrepreneurship in the financial sector, the Senators would be better served by evaluating different options to limit the size of Too Big Too Fail banks. A smarter idea would be to extend the retail bank deposits cap idea to total bank assets. Currently, no bank can have more than 10 percent of total national retail deposits (Bank of America got a waiver for the 2007 purchase of Chicagoland’s LaSalle bank and now has 12.2 percent of national deposits). Peter Boone and Simon Johnson suggest applying this simple principle to total bank liabilities. They recommend a limit of 2 percent of GDP, which is in line with the $300 billion that Felix Salmon has been recommending since March. Importantly, it’s also in line with the de facto $100 billion threshold that bank regulators are using now.

This way the government isn’t running banks and bankers can pursue the capitalist impulse that drives our economy. But with a cap on liabilities, the decisions of bankers cannot threaten our economy like they have in the past.

Some Unanswered Questions on Financial Reform

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA)-authored Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed the House Financial Services Committee last Wednesday, and could come to a floor vote in the House as soon as this week. Through legislative jujitsu on Frank’s part, the bill will have a lead on Sen. Chris Dodd’s (D-CT) efforts in the Senate.

The day after the committee passed the legislation, I saw Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) talk about it at an event hosted by the National Journal and got to exchange a few words with him on the subject. He was positive about the bill and its chances in the House (it will likely pass easily), and gave positive marks to the administration’s handling of the crisis in its first year in office.

But while Perlmutter said he felt the House has done its part to address regulatory reforms, I thought some of the accomplishments he touted leave unanswered fundamental questions raised by the financial crisis.

He spoke about the legislation’s planned Financial Stability Council, that would provide a forum for regulators like the Fed to address systemic risk. But the Financial Stability Council, instead of facilitating coordination among regulators, won’t live up to expectations — much like what happened with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that was supposed to facilitate information-sharing in the intelligence sector, but has had limited effectiveness in getting different agencies to talk to each other. The weak mandate of a Financial Stability Council would lead to regulator shopping by financial institutions, a temptation that can lead to problems similar to those seen in the case of under-regulated AIG. Moreover, the resolution authority that the council would have is useful only after the fact — it would not preemptively deal with the Too Big To Fail problem we still face.

Fixing Mark-to-Market Requirements

More generally, however, Perlmutter mentioned two ideas the House is considering that could actually contain the seeds of our next crisis.

One idea is extending the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) loosening of mark-to-market requirements for financial institutions to value their securities. Perlmutter wants to suspend mark-to-market and make permanent the FASB’s contentious April decision to ease mark-to-market rules.

The rule would let the Financial Stability Council order FASB to suspend mark-to-market in cases where there is no market in a security or securities are being sold in a “fire sale” or distressed environment. More worrisome, however, is that banks get to declare whether the market in the securities they are holding is distressed or not. Banks can drive a truckload of bad investment decisions through this loophole without having to disclose them on their bottom line or affecting capital requirements. Under this new rule, banks will have no incentive to conduct diligent analysis of the securities they hold — anything that turns out to be worthless (like bonds backed by subprime loans) can just be called “distressed.” This would decrease transparency and not restore confidence to the system.

But mark-to-market does have the bad consequence of increasing volatility in bank balance sheets. During crises like last year’s, banks can even perversely see mark-to-market improve their bottom line the closer they get to bankruptcy.

A better idea than the one Perlmutter mentioned has been put forward by PPI contributor Robert Pozen in his new book, Too Big To Save. Pozen suggests delinking banking capital regulations from accounting mark-to-market rules by effectively recognizing all securities as being “held for sale” (an accounting distinction) for regulatory purposes. This would allow us to continue to keep the transparency in assets that mark-to-market allows, while avoiding the bottom line volatility that banks would like to avoid.

What to Do About Sarbanes-Oxley

The second idea is exempting firms from some Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) reporting requirements. Passed in the wake of Enron, SOX was designed to hold companies and their executives accountable for their auditing, and eliminate some glaring conflicts of interest in financial auditing.

SOX does two good things. It makes a publicly held company have legitimate auditors, and ensures that those same auditors aren’t also advising the company on how to prepare the books for auditing (thereby basically handing over the answer key before a test). SOX also made sure that companies had proper controls that minimized the risk of errors in financial statements and of people either using company money inappropriately (as Enron did in off-balance-sheet shell companies) and of people embezzling money. Exempting firms from this would eventually lead to the same bad behavior happening again.

That said, SOX isn’t without flaws. Many in the auditing industry perceive it as very manpower intensive and, as a result, a significant burden to publicly listed companies, especially smaller ones (with income under $100 million). The SEC has responded by annually exempting small companies from some reporting requirements, but the exemption is not going to be extended past next year.

The solution to this problem is to streamline SOX to make it less burdensome to companies, not gutting it and letting new Enrons bubble up. Instead of providing an internal control report with each annual filing to the SEC — which can require up to three percent of a small company’s income — the SEC and Congress should encourage accounting oversight boards to spell out further guidelines and best practices to adopt. This streamlined SOX could even be extended to non-public financial institutions, as a key part of what allowed Bernie Madoff to steal people’s money for so long was having a small one-man upstate auditor keep tabs on his multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.

STATEMENT: Bipartisan Group Urges For Cost Containment on Health Care Reform

Thursday, December 3rd, 2009
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Signatories

The signatories to this memo are all members of the “Fiscal Seminar,” a group of budget experts that has been meeting together for several years. The views expressed are those of the individuals involved and should not be interpreted as representing the views of their respective institutions. For purposes of identification, the affiliation of each signatory is listed.


Download the PDF version of the statement.

December 3, 2009

We are a politically diverse group of veteran budget and policy analysts. Our mission is to raise public awareness of America’s fiscal predicament, which threatens to undermine our country’s economic strength and independence, and to propose constructive remedies.

Despite our different political leanings, we are united by the conviction that slowing the growth rate of U.S. health-care costs is essential to defusing the nation’s fiscal crisis. That’s because escalating medical costs, together with the aging of our population and gains in longevity, are fueling the unsustainable growth of our big entitlement programs: Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security.

No one has made this argument more convincingly than President Obama. “So to say it as plainly as I can, health care is the single most important thing we can do for America’s long-term fiscal health,” he told the American Medical Association in June.

The President added:

And if we fail to act, federal spending on Medicaid and Medicare will grow over the coming decades by an amount almost equal to the amount our government currently spends on our nation’s defense. It will, in fact, eventually grow larger than what our government spends on anything else today. It’s a scenario that will swamp our federal and state budgets, and impose a vicious choice of either unprecedented tax hikes, or overwhelming deficits, or drastic cuts in our federal and state budgets.

We agree with the President that health care reform must expand coverage in a fiscally responsible way. We applaud as well his insistence that health-care legislation not only must be fully paid for, but must also include effective steps to “bend down the curve” of health care cost growth over time.

The bill now being considered by the Senate comes closest to meeting these conditions. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Senate bill goes beyond deficit neutrality. It would reduce the federal deficit by $130 billion in the next decade but by only one-quarter of 1 percent of GDP over the following decade. These conclusions, however, rest on large projected cuts in Medicare provider payments. If Congress decides to scale back those cuts, as it has done before, the net effect will be to expand the federal deficit, even if health reform is scored as deficit-neutral.

The Senate bill’s cost containment features include an excise tax on high-cost insurance plans, a Medicare Commission charged with weeding out ineffective and inefficient care, and pilot projects designed to test incentives for providing high quality care, rather than a higher volume of services. These measures point in a promising direction. But we can do better. At a time of exploding deficits and debt, we owe it to our children to reform health care in ways that strengthen, not weaken, America’s long-term budget outlook.

Therefore, we urge President Obama and Senate leaders to work together to build even stronger cost containment provisions into the Senate bill. While members of our groupdiffer on the best prescriptions for lowering costs, we agree that a credible menu of options should include the following:

  • More thorough reform of the open-ended tax treatment of employer-sponsored health plans. This subsidy creates strong incentives for higher health care spending, and perversely bestows its largest benefits on high earners with the costliest health plans. To really bend the cost curve, Congress must go beyond half-measures intended simply to raise revenue. Instead it should sharply limit the tax exemption or shift it toward a uniform credit.
  • A stronger Medicare Commission that delivers both structural reform and immediate savings. Medicare’s costs have risen steadily even though its payment rates are well below those of private insurers. Congress should empower the Commission to examine all aspects of Medicare – including its dominant, fee-for-service design – not just prices and payments. And it should take up on an expedited basis the Commission’s recommendations for savings that would be used both to defray part of the cost of expanding health coverage and to reduce the program’s long-term liabilities.
  • Powerful incentives to promote more efficient and cost-effective practices. Health reform should encourage public and private insurers to replace fee-for-service payment systems with innovative methods – including performance-based payments, bundled payments, and capitated payments – that promote more efficient use of resources. In addition, new approaches to health care delivery, such as accountable care organizations, should be developed as a way of improving the efficiency and quality of care provided to patients. Research into the comparative effectiveness of treatments also could help link payment systems to performance. Health IT bonuses for “meaningful use” should be linked to achieving better results as part of systems of quality measurement, quality improvement and care coordination.
  • A federal health care budget. We believe substantive reforms in America’s big health programs are more likely to happen if they are buttressed by changes in the federal budget process. Last year, our group proposed that Congress establish an explicit budget for health care programs, and entitlements in general. Like budget caps and PAYGO rules, a health budget would be an action-forcing mechanism for moving toward serious, structural reforms of the nation’s entitlement programs.
  • Medical malpractice reform. None of the bills in Congress confronts the urgent need for a more reliable and less costly system of medical justice. Yet CBO recently estimated that enacting a “typical” package of tort reform proposals would reduce U.S. health care spending by roughly $54 billion over 10 years.

Health care reform and fiscal responsibility must go hand-in-hand. If we fail to get America’s fiscal house in order, more of our nation’s wealth will be siphoned off to service a crushing national debt. Automatic entitlement spending, which accounts for nearly half of federal spending, will eventually absorb nearly every dollar in taxes the government raises and crowd out spending on other pressing needs. Further, we will have to borrow even more from foreign lenders to make up the difference between what we consume and what we produce. This abject fiscal dependence erodes our sovereignty by giving other countries too much leverage over U.S. economic policy.

Health care reform, of course, is not the only step necessary to keep America’s debts from mushrooming out of control. We must also get to work on rebalancing the big entitlement programs to reflect both the aging of America and lengthening life spans. Overhauling our archaic tax system will be essential, as well.

But health care reform is the issue before us today, and slowing the pace of rising costs, while expanding coverage, must be an urgent priority.

Joe Antos
American Enterprise Institute
Will Marshall
Progressive Policy Institute
Robert Bixby
The Concord Coalition
Pietro Nivola
The Brookings Institution
Stuart Butler
Heritage Foundation
Rudolph Penner
Urban Institute
Alison Fraser
Heritage Foundation
Isabel Sawhill
The Brookings Institution
Ron Haskins
The Brookings Institution
C. Eugene Steuerle
Urban Institute
Maya MacGuineas
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget


Wall Street’s Bonus Problem

Friday, November 20th, 2009
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

For all of pay czar Kenneth Feinberg’s efforts, bonuses on Wall Street show no signs of slowing. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan Chase & Co. (all of which have paid back their TARP obligations) are reportedly paying $30 billion in bonuses this year.

There is a very simple reason that people on Wall Street are making so much money and will continue to do so, no matter what pay cuts are imposed. It is because there is still so much money to be made.

Over the last few decades, the too-smart-for-their-own-good set on Wall Street has become incredibly good at using money to make money through a devil’s dictionary of obscure trading strategies, as well as a rough fee structure for clients. In both areas, they have taken advantage of lax regulation and even laxer enforcement.

Consider: In the 2000s, the finance sector accounted for an absurdly high 41 percent of domestic corporate profits. Between 1973 and 1985, it never accounted for more than 16 percent; it has risen steadily since. In other words: an absurd amount of the wealth in this country is going to the bankers.

As long as this is the case, bonuses will continue to be absurd. Pay is a consequence of this distended economy-wide profit pie, not a cause. As long as there is money on the table (and there is), the clever folks in investment banking and hedge funds will find a way to make sure they’re the ones pocketing it.

The financial services regulation moving through the House and Senate will take some of this money off the table (though probably not enough), and may close some opportunities for making money out of the global economy through gouging and speculation (though, as I suggested in an earlier post, a financial transaction tax would make this more effective). But the important thing is that a Wall Street with a smaller place in the economy is also a Wall Street that will simply have less to pay its people.

The Real Reason to Support a Financial Transaction Tax

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

Thanks to Gordon Brown’s support, the idea of a financial transaction tax has been gaining a bit of attention over the last couple of weeks. The idea is simple: place a small tax (say, 0.25 percent or less) on all financial transactions.

Partially, it’s a way to raise a little revenue from those who can most afford to pay to create an insurance fund against future bailouts, which is how it is being billed. And just yesterday, it was reported that House Democrats have discussed using it to fund a jobs bill. (Dean Baker has estimated that the tax could bring in $100 billion.)

But mostly, it’s a good idea because it throws a little sand in the gears of the giant financial speculation casino.

Wall Street banks make a good deal of money by running very sophisticated computer programs, looking for tiny (and supposedly risk-free) arbitraging opportunities, and then making those opportunities pay off by investing with incredibly high volume. These trades are something like the equivalent of buying a bunch of dollars for 99.75 cents each. It’s a great deal if you can do it en masse, and an even better deal if you can also borrow almost all of the money you are investing.

But if banks had to pay a 0.25 percent tax on every dollar they sold, then it suddenly wouldn’t seem like such a good deal to buy dollars for 99.75 cents each. This is what a transaction tax would do.

This would mean that Wall Street banks would spend less time looking for short-term opportunities to buy dollar bills for 99.75 cents. This a good thing, because it’s hard to see how having some of the smartest people and most sophisticated computer programs dedicated to this kind activity helps the economy. Something is wrong when 40 percent of all U.S. corporate profits are coming from the financial sector, as they were for much of the 2000s.

A transaction tax would mean that banks would instead devote more time to investing their capital in good, long-term investments. This seems to me what a banking sector is supposed to do — allocate capital to the most promising business ventures, which then sometimes actually spur innovation and improve the standard of living for everyone, not just those who happen to be clever enough to take part in the big casino.

Unfortunately, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is against such a tax, and his support is pretty important, since any transaction tax would require an international agreement. This is not surprising, since Geithner is and always will be a creature of Wall Street.

Still, it’s hard not to marvel at the latest round of bonuses on Wall Street and wonder how it is that these guys are making $30 billion while the economy continues to stumble. Slowing down the Wall Street speculation machine might help channel some energy elsewhere — maybe into actual productive recovery.

Making Our Tax System More Fair

Monday, November 9th, 2009
Steven Chlapecka



Steven K. Chlapecka is the director of public affairs for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Steven Chlapecka

PPI’s Will Marshall and Mike Derham have a new column on reforming the U.S. tax system in the Washington Times :

Americans want a tax system that is fair, simple and capable of raising the revenue we need to pay the nation’s bills. The one we have fails on all three counts.

That’s why President Obama will probably have to add comprehensive tax reform to his already jammed agenda.

The first imperative of reform is to restore progressivity, the keystone of a fairer tax system. Since there is a lot of fatuous talk about “socialism” in the air these days, it’s worth noting that progressive taxation, which dates back to 1913, is a deeply American tradition.

It recognizes that our free enterprise system couldn’t function properly without public laws, rules and investments in common goods like schools, roads, police and defense. Those citizens who reap the greatest rewards from our modern, mixed economy therefore have an obligation to give back, as Thomas Jefferson put it, in proportion to the bounty they have received.

Read the full column at the Washington Times.

A Five-Billion-Dollar Canary

Wednesday, November 4th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Here in New York City, big numbers always dominate the local news. While it’s easy to talk about how Mike Bloomberg spent at least $90 million to squeak out a win in his race for a third term as mayor yesterday, these days the big number mentioned is $5.4 billion.

That’s the amount that local developer Tishman Speyer and investment powerhouse Blackrock spent to buy the huge Stuyvesant Town development in 2006, at the top of the real estate market. In turn, Tishman and and Blackrock turned around and packaged the promise of future rent flows from the complex as $4.4 billion in loans and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).

Since then, the Stuy Town project has been plagued by missteps. Promises to keep rates steady at rent-controlled levels — promises the joint venture had to make to get the city to agree to sell the property in 2006 — were almost immediately broken, with tenants being overcharged to the tune of $200 million. But with the downturn in the real estate market, defaults and late payments have risen at Stuy Town, endangering the new owners’ ability to meet their debt payments on the $3 billion in outstanding CMBS issued. People who claim to have looked at the finances claim Stuy Town only has enough liquidity to last through February. Even the eponymous Rob Speyer, co-chief executive along with his father, concedes the CMBS is going to require a restructuring.

In response, the Fitch ratings agency downgraded the CMBS bonds on Friday, and now says a default on the loans is likely.

While Stuy Town is unique in its size, it is not unique in its predicament. Real estate analysis firm Reis says the complex is indicative of the larger commercial real estate market:

About $26.64 billion of CMBS loans outstanding were 60 days or more past due last quarter, according to Reis. The default and delinquency rate rose to 4.52 percent from 0.8 percent a year earlier and 3 percent in the second quarter. Defaults may top 6 percent by year-end, the firm said.

This coming spike in defaults shows that even with the recent positive news — including last quarter’s 3.5% GDP growth — we’re not out of the woods yet. Most of that growth came from Recovery Act funds, including the “cash for clunkers” program and the increase in the first-time home-buyer’s credit. While this kind stimulus spending can provide an economic shot in the arm, it is not the basis for sustainable growth.

The collapse of the residential mortgage market (led by sub-prime mortgages losing value) was a big driver of the economic collapse of last year. The downturn that sends us into the second leg of a “W shaped recession” could be driven in part by the collapse of the commercial real estate market. Stuyvesant Town’s economic difficulties are a $5 billion canary telling us that things may get worse before they get better.