Posts Tagged ‘ Iran ’

Why Do We Keep Passing All These Sanctions Anyway?

Friday, June 25th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

A few weeks ago, the United Nations Security Council approved what have widely been hailed as the most wide-ranging and effective sanctions package against Iran ever. Today, word comes that the House and Senate have passed — by massive margins — a reconciled bill of unilateral American sanctions against Iran. The president will likely sign it.

As I’ve written before, it’s an open question how ultimately effective the UN sanctions will be, with massive loopholes for Chinese businesses (a necessary pre-condition for Chinese support in the UN Security Council, and ultimately the lesser of two evils) and a diplomatic split with Brazil and Turkey.

The current package on Obama’s desk looks to penalize companies that do business with Iran’s oil and gas sectors, as well as banks that deal with the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the group of thugs that’s the real power-broker in Tehran. Despite assurances from members of both parties that this bill forces companies into a with-us-or-against-us binary choice, it comes with significant risks: Will a rise in gas prices permit the Iranian regime to rally a divided population against a Western bully? How will the Green Movement, divided itself, react?

(If you want to see an alternate sanctions proposal, click here.)

These questions are particularly pressing amidst reports that Iran has been stockpiling fuel and reducing domestic consumption for six months.

But here’s where we need a lesson in why the international community goes to such lengths to negotiate and then impose sanctions in the first place. Political rhetoric that accompanies sanctions sets unrealistic expectations among Western audiences. Elected officials make it sound like each new round of sanctions will drive Iran to its knees or make them shudder in fear or some other impossible prediction.

The administration has to do a better job explaining why we impose sanctions. When news reports swirl about Iran skirting the sanctions by changing ships’ names, stockpiling fuel, and moving money around, it’s often portrayed in the press as a loss. But that’s actually proof that sanctions are working! The act of forcing Iran’s leadership to spend time and effort trying to evade sanctions is actually a success — it means that Iran’s actions have a cost associated with them.

There’s no guarantee, but the hope is that one day Iran’s rulers will wake up and say, “Gosh, I’m sick of trying to smuggle gas and move money around. It’s really starting to wear me down. It would be a lot easier if we could just do this above-board and have a real place in the international community.” Well, the only way to make that happen is to negotiate in good faith. If we drive Iran back to the negotiating table and force real concessions on their part, sanctions will have been a success.

Photo credit: United Nations Photo

A Look at the New U.N. Sanctions on Iran

Thursday, June 10th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The new United Nations Security Council has adopted a new round of sanctions against Iran. And they have some bite. But how and if they’ll truly be effective remains an open question.

Let’s start with the nuts and bolts. The sanctions compel Iran to comply with international inspections and to cease uranium enrichment. Failure to do so gets them this:

  • A strengthened arms embargo, prohibiting nations from exporting to Iran battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems.
  • The resolution imposes financial and travel sanctions on specific Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) individuals and companies involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile program.
  • Nations are authorized to inspect suspicious Iranian air and sea cargo for illicit items, interdict shipments in port and on the high seas, and confiscate any banned items found.
  • The Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is sanctioned for its role in transferring nuclear and missile program components. IRISL vessels have also been repeatedly caught exporting weapons to Hamas and Hezbollah.

But it’s never that straightforward. Let’s take a look at what’s going on underneath the surface.

The Security Council resolution was adopted by a 12-2 vote, with an abstention from Lebanon, whose divided government includes members of Iranian-backed Hezbollah. The two “no” votes came from Turkey and Brazil, countries that had negotiated a uranium-exporting deal with Iran. Unfortunately, as you can read here, that deal fell woefully short of what the U.S. and rest of the international community needed to feel comfortable.

Frankly, the Obama administration mishandled Turkey and Brazil’s attempts to mediate. The White House should have cautioned the intermediaries not to go public until the deal was acceptable to the U.S. and Europe (you know, the countries Turkey is in NATO with…). American and European rejection of the deal has caused gnashing of teeth in Ankara and Brasilia (not to mention two “no” votes on the final resolution), splitting the global effort to rein in Iran.

Iran, as you might expect, remains defiant. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad continues on his rhetorical hot streak, calling the sanctions “annoying flies.” And to a certain extent, he’s right. As Thomas Erdbrink and Colum Lynch’s excellent article in yesterday’s Washington Post details, Iran does a pretty darn good job getting around them. And then there’s the possibility that Iran could use the sanctions as a domestic political tool to rally Iranians against the “American oppressors.”

But perhaps atop the list of concerns sits Beijing. Sure, China voted for the sanctions, but at what price? Check out this post to see what sort of sweetheart loopholes China secured for its energy companies in exchange for its support. Phew. It’s a lot. A confusing mess of a lot. On the one hand, it seems like the international community has passed a resolution with some teeth, but could sanctions end up being ineffective or, worse, counterproductive?

In the end, sanctions’ benefits are often indirect, subtle and not guaranteed. To get a sense of why sanctions are passed, bear in mind the Obama administration’s real goal: It’s not to inflict direct economic hardship, but rather, to raise the burden Iran must bear to obtain a nuclear weapon.

Sanctions can help the international community do so in two clear ways:

  1. Diplomatic isolation. Of course, Iran has been fairly isolated for years and years now, but it doesn’t hurt to reinforce that sense of isolation from the international community on a regular basis. That’s why, incidentally, the Turkey/Brazil split and recruitment of China and Russia all matter. Getting the world on the same page against Iran sends a message of strength.
  2. When sanctions force Tehran to rearrange shipping contracts, sell vessels to front companies, move money, set up laundering and smuggling operations, stay at home from travel, etc., etc., those are all “costs.” To maintain a something close to the status quo, Iran has to invest time, money and political capital (both at home and internationally) to work around them.

The idea is that one day, Iran will wake up and say, “Huh. We’re alone in the world and working like hell to beat these things. Maybe we should sit down and talk this whole situation through.”

That day may never come, but it’s the best alternative the international community has.

Photo credit: wallyg

Iran Sends Its Own Gaza-Bound Flotilla

Monday, June 7th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Over the weekend, Iran’s foreign ministry decided it would be a peach of an idea to send an Iranian Red Crescent flotilla to Gaza. If the flotilla reaches the shores off Gaza — and check out a Middle East map and you’ll see that Tehran is going to need some “local help” so it doesn’t have to head around the Horn of Africa — it could create an international firestorm that makes the fallout from the first flotilla look like a three-year-old’s birthday party.

To the casual observer, the Iranian Red Crescent may seem like a harmless international charity intent on do-gooding. It is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the world’s largest humanitarian network.

But lest anyone think the Iranian Red Crescent is an independent charity that has made a humanitarian decision to send the flotilla to Gaza out of the goodness of its heart, click here. That’s the Google translation of the announcement of Abolhassan Faghih’s appointment as the Iranian Red Crescent’s president by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. What’s more, the decision to send the flotilla was likely made within the halls of the Iranian foreign ministry in Tehran. Does that sound independent? Indeed, it’s almost certain that Ahmadinejad is using this flotilla as a direct extension of Iranian foreign policy.

And if the situation isn’t handled with extraordinary deftness, it could just spark a war.

Imagine the scenario: An Iranian-backed flotilla attempts to capitalize on the public relations “success” of last week’s tragedy. Israel, having dug its heels in on the naval blockade while sending mixed messages on the humanitarian issue, calculates that the last thing in the world it needs is to hand Iran a propaganda victory. After all, the Israel Defense Force just took out a handful of alleged terrorist divers off Gaza, which is a fair indication that the beating they’ve taken in the international press after last week isn’t going to make them back down.

In the face of impending physical confrontation, Tehran, as we’ve seen far too often over the last year, has little concern for the lives of its own citizens and encourages the flotilla onward. Israel fires. Tehran responds. The situation escalates … you can imagine the ugly fallout.

For the mullahs in Tehran, the situation is a win-win no-brainer. Either breaking the Israeli blockade or having its citizens die at Tel Aviv’s hands would be a massive propaganda victory that could potentially rally disaffected Iranians around the president. And if the situation becomes violent and Iran looks like a victim, it could decrease pressure within the UN Security Council for nuclear sanctions.

If we look purely at the strategic implications of the Red Crescent flotilla, the only way to diffuse the situation is to make aid in Gaza a non-issue. That’s why in light of the obvious humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza’s citizens, Israel needs to facilitate a massive injection of aid into the strip.

And it better do it quickly. After all, were Iran to somehow fail, someone else would just send another flotilla soon.

Photo credit: Indigoprime’s Photostream

Congress Puts the Breaks on Iran Sanctions – But Is the UN’s Deal Any Better?

Thursday, May 27th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, a potentially counterproductive Iran sanctions bill working its way through Congress, has been delayed. Versions of the law had been passed by both houses and were being reconciled in conference committee. A staffer I spoke to a few weeks ago suggested that the bill would be signed by Memorial Day.

But no longer. My friend Brian Wingfield at Forbes reported this week that bill sponsors Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) have delayed their bill for at least a month.

A delay, and potential scuttling of the law, may not be the worst thing in the world. Read Pirooz Hamvatan’s and Ali K‘s piece on P-Fix a few weeks ago, where they point out the current bill’s flaws:

The new bill aims to cripple Iran’s economy in response to Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear program. But the sanctions being proposed are not the right answer. Such a sweeping measure would end up only hurting ordinary Iranians, especially the middle class that the U.S. must shore up to improve Iran’s chances for reform.

The delay is thanks to the UN Security Council, which announced it had reached a multilateral sanctions deal with China and Russia. Dodd and Berman say they preferred the multilateral approach all along, and seem content to let that process play out. Both China and Russia have been reluctant partners, so the deal is a potentially big diplomatic win for the Obama administration.

However, it raises the question — why would these holdouts acquiesce to the UN sanctions package now? Did they suddenly see the light? With all the exemptions and loopholes for Chinese companies, it’s doubtful in at least Beijing’s case. Check out this TIME article for a good explanation:

Beijing extracted a significant price for its support. Not only has Beijing watered down the sanctions to be adopted by the Security Council in order to ensure they don’t restrain China from expanding its already massive economic ties with Iran; Chinese analysts also claim that, in the course of a protracted series of negotiations with Washington, their government also won undertakings from Washington to exempt Chinese companies from any U.S. unilateral sanctions that punish third-country business partners with the Islamic Republic.

The Russians must have not gotten such a great deal. Iranian President Ahmadinejad singled out Moscow as a “historic enemy” for supporting UN sanctions, but seems to have forgotten to mention Beijing.

In the end, we’re left with a potentially counterproductive bill out of Congress, or an imperfect UN package. I’ll take the UN version any day of the week — even though Chinese companies get exemptions, it’s better to forge a strong international coalition against Iran’s nuclear program.

And members of Congress who supported that bill can still campaign on their vote, whether or not it ever gets to the president.

Photo credit: Daniella Zalcman/ CC BY-NC 2.0

The Other NPT

Tuesday, May 18th, 2010
Benn Tannenbaum



Benn Tannenbaum is an adjunct professor of physics at Georgetown University and is the Science and Security Scholar in Georgetown's Program on Science in the Public Interest.

by Benn Tannenbaum

Nuclear Controlled AreaThis month 189 countries are gathered at the United Nations in New York for a review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This review, which has occurred every five years since the treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995, is designed to give the member states the opportunity to discuss how the goals of the treaty are being met — or not. In broad terms, the treaty obliges those members with nuclear weapons to get rid of them and those members without nuclear weapons to never seek them, while promoting peaceful use of the atom by all.

The NPT, as the treaty is informally known, has been highly successful to date: a slow but steady global spread of nuclear power has occurred, while at the same time, many countries have elected to halt nuclear weapons programs and join the treaty regime; three countries — Israel, India and Pakistan — have never ratified the treaty and are either known or believed to have nuclear weapons; only one country — North Korea — has abandoned the regime and developed weapons; and only one country — Iran — is currently believed to be developing a nuclear weapons program while still notionally adhering to the treaty. One of the reasons the NPT has been so successful in promoting nuclear power while damping the spread of nuclear weapons are the guidelines created by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG, a consortium of the countries that build and supply the vast majority of the materials required to build and maintain a nuclear power or nuclear medicine program. These guidelines exist “to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices which would not hinder international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field.”

It is time, however, to consider a different NPT, namely, a Non-Proliferation Tax. This NPT is the indirect price everyone pays for keeping dangerous nuclear materials and nuclear technologies out of the hands of those who might use it for nefarious purposes. But don’t worry — this isn’t a new tax up for debate.  Rather, it’s part of the current taxes individuals and businesses already pay.

Some of what we get out of this tax is obvious: funding U.S. diplomats and technical experts to work on these issues at the United Nations and other international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to coordinate U.S. work with the NSG. Other efforts are well known, such as those led by the U.S. Departments of State and Energy collectively known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program — or Nunn-Lugar Program, for the Senators most responsible for writing the 1992 legislation that created the program. These programs have helped to secure Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials and to provide Russian and other former Soviet weapons scientists with the training to find work in non-weapons fields; they are being expanded to cover other topics, such as the life sciences, and other parts of the world, such as South and Southeast Asia.

Other efforts that are funded by this non-proliferation tax include the Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI, and the Second Line of Defense, SLD, program. The PSI is a program, started under the G.W. Bush administration and is a collaboration among some 95 countries to intercept illicit shipments of nuclear equipment and materials. The SLD program, also started under the G.W. Bush administration, is installing radiation portal monitors at border crossings and major seaports all over the world in an effort to detect smuggled fissile materials and improvised and stolen nuclear weapons.

Some of these programs are expensive — the SLD program will cost billions of dollars, and the U.S. has spent many more billions over the past 15 years — but the importance of the programs is also irrefutable. Some have calculated that this cost is $50 per month for every household in the U.S.

The problem, though, is that the cost of nuclear proliferation isn’t always obvious to the people, companies, and industries that directly benefit from the nuclear power sources that this money safeguards.  After all, the programs are run by the U.S. government and funded by U.S. taxpayers, not by ratepayers or by the nuclear industry. The goal, then, should be to ensure that nuclear power spreads in a way that doesn’t require a significant growth in the non-proliferation tax. This requires careful examination of new enrichment and reprocessing technologies, to make sure that development and commercialization of these new technologies will not make it harder to safeguard the facilities that use them or to detect covert programs. It also requires the broad industry-wide information sharing program suggested in my last column.

This is not an insurmountable problem, but requires that a holistic view of the costs of the proliferation of nuclear technologies be taken as we see an expansion of nuclear power.

Confronting Iran: The Case for Targeted Sanctions

Wednesday, April 28th, 2010
Pirooz Hamvatan



Pirooz Hamvatan is the pseudonym for a Washington, D.C.-based analyst focusing on Iranian domestic and security issues.

Ali K



Ali K is currently a business student in the U.S. and a supporter of Iran’s Green Movement who was severely beaten by the Basij militia during a peaceful demonstration in Tehran last year.

by Pirooz Hamvatan and Ali K

The following is a guest column from Pirooz Hamvatan, a pseudonym for a Washington, D.C.-based analyst focusing on Iranian domestic and security issues, and Ali K., currently a business student in the U.S. and a supporter of Iran’s Green Movement who was severely beaten by the Basij militia during a peaceful demonstration in Tehran last year.

Congress is on the verge of sending a petroleum sanctions bill to President Obama that has wide bipartisan support in Congress. But far from posing a serious challenge to the regime, the bill could in fact inadvertently undermine long-term U.S. interests by weakening the Iranian civil rights movement and strengthening President Ahmadinejad and his cronies.

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, currently in conference committee, will direct the president to impose sanctions on any entity providing Iran with “refined petroleum products” worth $200,000 or more per transaction, or $1 million per year. The bill defines refined petroleum products to include diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and aviation gasoline.

The new bill aims to cripple Iran’s economy in response to Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear program. But the sanctions being proposed are not the right answer. Such a sweeping measure would end up only hurting ordinary Iranians, especially the middle class that the U.S. must shore up to improve Iran’s chances for reform.

Instead, our top priority should be helping to increase the space for the Iranian civil rights movement. That means moving beyond the limited focus on “solving” the nuclear issue. An Iranian government that is more accountable to — and representative of — its moderate majority would not pose a security threat to the U.S. and its allies. Rather than heavy-handed sanctions, the Obama administration should consider restrictions that are more targeted, which would hit the ruling regime where it hurts, and increase the possibility of change from within.

The Wrong Path

Introduced in the House by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and in the Senate by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), the sanctions bill currently in conference aims to limit Iran’s access to gasoline in the hopes that the suffering population will pressure the regime to give in to Western demands. But if the end goal is to induce Iran to be a more responsible regional actor that doesn’t threaten U.S. security interests, then petroleum sanctions are likely to achieve the opposite effect.

Just look at the experience of the last couple of decades. In 1995, in response to Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology and support of terrorism, President Clinton issued two executive orders prohibiting American investment in Iran’s energy sector and banning U.S. imports of most Iranian goods. The following year, Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (PDF), calling for sanctions on foreign firms investing more than $20 million per year in Iran’s energy sector. Although such measures have impeded the development of Iran’s economy, they have not caused the Islamic Republic to change course on its nuclear program or its funding of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In fact, in order to achieve their foreign policy and domestic goals, Iran’s leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to let the Iranian people suffer.

Just as important, history has shown that crippling sanctions undermine the middle class — the very people who are the backbone of civil society and the voices of moderation. International sanctions on Iraq weakened its population, making them more reliant on, and more vulnerable to, Saddam Hussein’s regime. Gasoline sanctions on Iran could have a similar effect, exacerbating inflation, lowering the quality of life for the middle class and pushing more people below the poverty line.

Gasoline sanctions would also distract Iranians from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s own mismanagement of the economy — an important issue mobilizing people around the Green Movement — and divert blame to the U.S. Iran is already facing a 20-percent inflation rate, a crippled domestic industry, unemployment of over 11 percent (with 24 percent of 15-to-24 year-olds unemployed), and one of the worst rates of brain drain in the world. Many Iranians are still seething over the fact that, since becoming president in 2005, Ahmadinejad squandered unprecedented oil revenues that the Islamic Republic accrued as a result of high world oil prices. Amid all of this, Ahmadinejad has backed a controversial measure that would phase out government subsidies on gasoline and is likely to increase inflation. The Iranian people are already facing enough hardship without the U.S. adding to their woes and diminishing the pro-American sentiments of a wide array of Iranians.

Nor will the sanctions loosen the regime’s grip on power. Ahmadinejad’s faction would, in fact, fare better than the majority of the populace. Masters of smuggling, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members would still be able to bring in gasoline through Iran’s porous borders, perversely enriching themselves even more.

The Right Path

But if broad sanctions are a heavy-handed tool that could only risk the development of Iran’s civil rights movement, what options do U.S. policy makers have to challenge the regime?

A preferred approach would be something more targeted against those responsible for Iran’s actions: the members of the ruling regime. Congress should consider the following:

  • Pass a bill calling on the U.S. State Department to identify Iranian human rights abusers (primarily from within the Revolutionary Guards; the Basij, the regime’s volunteer militia; and the judiciary) and impose travel bans on them. The bill should also seek the cooperation of our allies in enforcing the ban as widely as possible and place pressure on key countries like Dubai to block entry to these individuals. The list of targeted offenders should be made public in order to show the Iranian people that the U.S. is on their side.
  • Pass a measure calling for human rights abusers’ assets to be frozen. Because Iranian officials have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from the U.S. financial system, the U.S. Treasury may not have much of a role to play here. Rather, such a measure would simply be a first step in convincing banks in Europe and the United Arab Emirates — where many regime insiders’ assets are squirreled away — to enforce restrictions.

What specific effect will travel bans have on hardline officials and their mid-ranking employees? Besides being a major inconvenience, it would hurt their pocketbooks. This is because a large number of these individuals have side-businesses in which they smuggle goods from places like Dubai, Thailand, Indonesia and Syria — buying, for example, electronic goods and bringing them back to Iran through Revolutionary Guard-controlled customs stations without having to pay import duties. They then sell these goods at highly marked-up prices in the isolated Iranian market. A strictly enforced travel ban — including on individuals working for these human rights abusers’ front companies — would close off a lucrative source of income.

To be clear, the overall intent of this plan is not necessarily to deal a significant economic blow to the entire hardline establishment — that would be next to impossible. Neither will it convince, in the short term, current Iranian leaders to change course on the nuclear program — no outside pressure will. Rather the strategy is to increase the disincentives for individuals to participate in or condone oppressive behavior, with the goal of helping the Green Movement flourish.

At the same time, it is important not to target certain high level officials who may have the capacity to play a role in moving Iran toward reform. For instance, while it may be justified to sanction Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani for allowing hardliners to abuse Iran’s legal system to persecute reformers, his brother Ali Larijani — the pragmatic conservative Speaker of Parliament and bitter Ahmadinejad rival — has not been complicit in human rights abuses, and thus should not be snared by the sanctions net. This nuanced targeting will send a signal to the regime’s officials that they will be left alone if they refrain from abusing their fellow citizens.

Moreover, certain Iranian leaders are sensitive to international accusations of human rights abuses. This is not for altruistic reasons, but because they want the Islamic Republic to be seen as a role model to the Islamic world, and not simply another run-of-the-mill Middle Eastern dictatorship.

To be sure, human rights sanctions alone may not alleviate the pressure currently being placed on Iran’s Green Movement. Regime hardliners could blame the U.S. for fomenting post-election unrest and paint Iran’s dissidents as Western spies. Republican Guard members and Basijis could continue their human rights abuses regardless of travel bans and asset freezes. But that is the status quo in Iran. There is little cost to the U.S. if human rights sanctions don’t work — and much to gain if they do.

A Broader, Pro-Reform Agenda

Human rights sanctions are not a silver bullet. They will not bring the regime to its knees. But neither will gasoline sanctions. Fortunately, it appears that the Obama administration is asking Congress to slow down its push for unilateral gasoline sanctions as the U.N. Security Council deliberates over its own sanctions during the next few months. Meanwhile, targeted sanctions against human rights abusers is being pushed by Sen. John McCain, though not as stand-alone legislation but as an amendment to the flawed gas sanctions bill.

A human rights sanctions package can be an effective part of a broader effort to help Iran’s Green Movement chart its own course toward a better future for Iranians. Other essential pieces to this strategy would include:

  • Rep. Jim Moran’s (D-VA) Iranian Digital Empowerment Act, which seeks to help get information-sharing software and filter-breaking technology into the hands of Iranian reformers.
  • Rep. Keith Ellison’s (D-MN) Stand With the Iranian People Act, which (in addition to calling for human rights abusers to be sanctioned) calls for suspension of U.S. government funding to entities that sell censorship and surveillance equipment to the regime, and seeks to ease restrictions on American charities that want to work in Iran.

Bills focusing on the Islamic Republic’s human rights abuses have an excellent chance of passing in Congress because they are politically appealing — they help legislators look tough on national security while promoting American values of freedom and democracy. Moreover, they avoid the danger that is inherent with sweeping economic sanctions: that of harming the people they were intended to help.

Moreover, U.S. passage of human rights sanctions could lead allies in Europe to follow suit. Although the U.N. Security Council is unlikely to do so — China and Russia are adamantly opposed to interfering in others’ domestic affairs — if the U.S. and European allies banded together to pressure countries like Dubai to enforce travel bans, sanctions would have a greater chance of success.

In the end, it is important to remember that the members of the Green Movement are fighting for reform within the Islamic Republic system. Their demands include an independent electoral commission, the release of all political prisoners and freedom of speech. Acknowledging that it is up to the Iranian people to chart their own course, the U.S. can best protect its own security interests by helping to level the playing field in Iran, allowing the moderate, peace-loving majority of Iranians to continue their journey toward a better future for their country and the broader Middle East.

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Four Things Obama Needs to Do in the Middle East

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010
Shadi Hamid



Shadi Hamid is the deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

by Shadi Hamid

In a recent piece, I discussed the growing sense of “Bush nostalgia” among Arab reformers. Such nostalgia has less to do with George W. Bush and more to do with the period of democratic promise the Middle East experienced in 2004-5, partly a result of aggressive, but short-lived, efforts to put pressure on authoritarian regimes.

For its part, the Obama administration has shown little real interest in democratization in the Arab world, falling back on the “pragmatic” neo-realism of the Clinton and first Bush administrations. Compared to the destructive policies of his predecessor, President Obama’s approach seems a breath of fresh air. But his foreign policy vision, while certainly sensible, has so far been remarkably conventional and unimaginative. Perhaps that’s what was initially needed. Now, however, is the time for bolder, more creative policy making. Here are four things Obama can – and should – do in the Middle East to advance U.S. interests and ideals:

  • Recognize the region’s changing balance of power. Traditional allies like Egypt and Jordan (two of the world’s largest U.S. aid recipients) are losing influence. Increasingly authoritarian, erratic and perceived as excessively pro-American, they have little credibility with Arab audiences. On the other hand, emerging powers like Turkey and Qatar are pursuing independent foreign policies and maintaining positive relations with both the West and the “rejectionist” camp (Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah). Not surprisingly, both countries, seen as “honest brokers,” have played a major role in mediating regional conflicts and supporting dialogue efforts, including on the Syrian-Israeli, Israeli-Palestinian, Hamas-Fatah and internal Lebanese tracks. The U.S. should encourage their efforts, keeping in mind that they may be uniquely well-positioned to exert influence on Iran and Syria.
  • Promote Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey is the closest thing the Middle East has to a “model,” one of only two countries in the world led by a democratically elected Islamist party. According to a 2009 survey, 64 percent of Arab respondents in seven countries believe “Turkey’s EU membership prospects make Turkey an attractive partner for reform in the Arab world.” Considering its growing regional importance, the U.S. cannot afford for Turkey to turn inward and become embroiled in conflict between its secularist military and Islamist-leaning government. For a time, Turkey’s desire to join the EU provided incentives to implement wide-ranging legal and political reforms. However, as the EU drags its feet on accession talks, and Turks lose hope in EU membership, the reform process looks less encouraging than ever. Turkey must, however, remain enmeshed in Western institutions and partnerships. The Obama administration should use its leverage with European allies to ensure the accession process moves forward.
  • Begin strategic engagement with nonviolent Islamist groups. In most Arab countries, Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, are the largest, most influential opposition groups. But Obama has so far failed to engage them, despite his emphasis on “dialogue” with diverse actors. Engagement would serve several purposes, discussed in detail here, including information-gathering, improving our credibility with Arab publics and putting pressure on autocratic regimes to open up. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or another senior official, could begin by giving a major speech on the U.S. and political Islam (something which the Clinton administration did on several occasions), stating unequivocally that the U.S. will accept democratic outcomes, even if that means the election of Islamist parties. The State Department should also issue a directive explicitly permitting State Department employees, including ambassadors in the region, to meet with and incorporate members of Islamist organizations in their programming.
  • Embrace “positive conditionality.” The U.S. gives hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Arab authoritarian regimes. Rather than cutting aid, which is unlikely to be politically viable, the U.S. could offer large packages in additional assistance, conditioned on meeting a series of explicit benchmarks on democratization. If the country failed to meet these benchmarks, the aid would be withheld and carried over to a reform “endowment” for the next fiscal year. This way, the more governments rejected the aid, the greater the incentive would be to accept it in future years.

None of these four “steps” are particularly revolutionary. But that’s the point: the Obama administration could take action immediately – if it had the political will. With the troop drawdown in Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear threat, there may be a temptation to wait for a better time. But, in the Middle East, the better time, sadly, never seems to come.

If anything, a confluence of factors appears to be converging, suggesting the time to act is now. There are critical elections in Egypt and Jordan coming up in 2010 (and 2011). For the first time in Egypt, there is an inspiring national figure, Mohamed ElBaradei, who seems capable of uniting a notoriously fractious opposition behind a common vision for reform. Egypt, along with Algeria and Tunisia, will be facing succession struggles sooner rather than later. Meanwhile, internal tensions in Turkey seem to be rising, with the threat of escalation looming in the background. In other words, this is a difficult time of transition in the Middle East and the U.S. will need to do considerably more than just tread water.

The views expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Obama’s Nuclear Initiatives: Public Supports Means If Not Ends

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

As the administration’s Nuclear Security Summit takes place in Washington this week, CNN has a new look at public opinion on a variety of issues related to nuclear weapons policy. And it’s safe to say that there is strong public support for what the President’s is proposing, if not always for the utopian-sounding goals he has articulated.

The latter problem is not new. In a May 2009 Democracy Corps survey that found remarkably strong support for Obama’s foreign policy and national security leadership — strong enough, in fact, to all but erase the traditional “national security gap” between Democrats and Republicans — Obama’s stated goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons got a decidedly lukewarm reaction, with 60 percent of Americans agreeing that “eliminating all nuclear weapons in the world is not realistic or good for America’s security.”

The DCorps question on this subject combined skepticism about a nuclear-weapons-free world with opposition to the idea on national security grounds. But CNN separates the two issues, and while respondents split right down the middle (with significant differences based on age, as over-50s who remember the Cold War tend to be negative) on the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons, the percentage thinking this can actually happen has dropped from one-third in 1988 to one-fourth today.

But the big difference between May 2009 and today in terms of nuclear weapons policy is that the President is now taking concrete steps to address the “loose nukes” issue, to build-down nuclear weapons in conjunction with Russia, and to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime (in conjunction with efforts to isolate Iran’s defense of its nuclear program). And CNN finds strong support for Obama in every tangible area, even if his long-range goals still produce skepticism.

Most importantly, 70 percent of Americans — including 68 percent of independents and even 49 percent of Republicans — think the Senate should ratify the START Treaty with Russia, despite the predictable charges of “weakness” against Obama that have been emanating from many conservative circles since the treaty was signed. With a two-thirds Senate vote being required for ratification of the treaty, that’s probably just enough public support to keep Republican defense hard-liners (and/or obdurate Obama-haters) from launching a big Senate fight.

Moreover, by giving high-profile attention to the “loose nukes” issue, Obama is tapping a deep well of public anxiety about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. By a 7-to-1 margin, respondents to the CNN poll said “preventing terrorists from getting nuclear weapons” should be a high priority than “reducing nuclear weapons controlled by unfriendly countries.” One of the great ironies of the Bush years was that his administration constantly promoted fears about nuclear terrorism while making nuclear security a very low priority, even in bilateral relations with Russia. Dick Cheney, in particular, treated truculent and unilateral behavior towards potential adversaries as the sole means of preventing nuclear terrorism. By unpacking nuclear security from other issues and making it a focus of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, Obama is linking diplomacy with a national security concern that Americans care about passionately.

Public support for the president’s nuclear weapons policies will get its strongest test beginning next month with the beginning of a scheduled review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As Steven Clemons notes in an excellent overview of Obama’s “nuclear wizardry” at Politico today, that’s where the rubber will need to start meeting the road in terms of the administration’s efforts to round up the world community for an effective united front towards Iran’s nuclear program. But it’s clear the president’s nuclear initiatives are off to a very good start despite generic conservative carping.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

The Cold War Is Over, But the Nukes Are Still Here

Monday, April 12th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

President Obama sure is spending a lot of time worrying about nuclear weapons this week. Today’s Nuclear Security Summit – a meeting of over 40 world leaders in Washington, D.C. – caps seven days of highly publicized events on nuclear security.

The attention lavished on atomic weapons feels almost anachronistic, invoking a Cold War-era standoff that now seems so distant. Twenty-five years ago, I was a third grader at St. Joan of Arc in Chagrin Falls, Ohio. Once a month, Ms. Elliot would trot my class into the hallway where we’d kneel down and clasp our hands behind our necks. This wasn’t some strange Catholic school ritual – we were “protecting” ourselves from a Soviet nuclear attack.

While I realize now that this defensive maneuver wouldn’t have kept me safe from a direct hit on the jungle gym, the looming threat of a mushroom cloud over the American Midwest felt real.

It doesn’t today. The end of the Cold War, years of American military dominance and improving, if occasionally frustrating, relations with Moscow have effectively banished the threat of mutually assured destruction. Beyond Russia, it’s nearly impossible to imagine China, perhaps the United States’ “near-peer” military competitor but also its financial Siamese twin, launching its nuclear weapons.

But nuclear security must be important – just glance at Obama’s schedule. Before signing the New START accord with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev last Thursday, his administration released its Nuclear Posture Review, an important document that redefines the way America will use the 1550 deployed warheads New START permits. And today the president is convening the summit of world leaders in Washington, D.C.

It’s not only this week. These events are part of a yearlong effort that began last April when President Obama spoke about his vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

It’s a long-term goal to be sure — Obama has been clear that America would retain its arsenal as long as others did. But it’s hardly a liberal fantasy — conservative icons like former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz have joined forces with mainstream Democrats like former Senator Sam Nunn and Defense Secretary Bill Perry to promote a nuclear-free world.

They’re following the legacy of Ronald Reagan, who nearly signed on to sweeping nuclear restrictions with Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland in 1986, and George H.W. Bush, who signed the START treaty in 1991.

So with no Cold War threat, what’s the urgency? Why is the president wasting time negotiating with countries that wouldn’t dare attack us anyway?

Here’s why — it’s not state-sponsored atomic destruction that’s the threat. It’s the al-Qaeda operative with a nuclear suitcase. That sounds crazy, right? Then again, we never could have imagined that three airliners could bring down the Twin Towers and slam into the Pentagon. President Obama realizes that a nuclear arsenal in the hands of nation-states still poses a threat, albeit from stateless ones.

How, then, does a stuffy gathering of world leaders at a conference center in Washington, D.C. keep the bomb away from a small-fry terrorist? First, curbing nuclear proliferation depends on the large nuclear powers — U.S., Russia, China, U.K. and France — showing a serious and sustained effort towards nuclear disarmament that convinces the smaller nuclear powers — India, Pakistan and Israel — and nuclear weapons aspirants — North Korea and Iran — to feel comfortable without them. That dialogue needs to start on a big stage, particularly for American allies India and Pakistan, who may want to do the right thing but happen to be mortal enemies.

What’s more, it’s the North Koreas, Irans and Pakistans of the world that stand the greatest chance of selling nuclear technology to the black market’s highest bidder. Getting those countries to swear off nuclear weapons planning is critical. Just ask A.Q. Khan — he might be a hero as the father of the Pakistani A-bomb, but he has also sold nuclear secrets to Iran and North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s for tens of millions of dollars.

We need nation-states to control their nuclear scientists, and getting everyone on the same page — as Obama’s doing — is the first step to achieving that goal.

We are long-removed from cowering in the hallway of my Catholic school in Ohio, but that doesn’t mean the nuclear threat died with the Cold War. It has simply changed. That’s why the Obama administration is spending so much time yanking America’s nuclear security policy into the 21st century.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/travlr/

The Five Most Ridiculous Conservative Statements About Obama’s Nuclear Policy

Friday, April 9th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The other day, I wrote a column about how the president’s focus on nuclear weapons was a solid opportunity to finally achieve some bipartisanship. I won’t rehash those arguments here, but I encourage you to read the piece. Much of the conservative intelligentsia actually agrees with me, and some have noted that any objections to the president’s moves are simply rooted in politics because there is “no substantive disagreement with what Obama has done.” But that hasn’t stopped some from favoring politics over good governance and — as Kevin Sullivan at RCW points out – start a new “silly season.”

So here, friends, are the five most ridiculous conservative lines about this week’s focus on nuclear security:

5. “[T]he real threat today is proliferation and terrorism. This treaty, of course, doesn’t have anything to do with that.” – Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ)

Au contraire — the New START has EVERYTHING to do with proliferation and terrorism. The key to convincing the Irans, North Koreas and Pakistans of the world that building and/or selling nuclear weapons isn’t necessary is to have demonstrable proof that the big nuclear nations are serious about arms control themselves. So we have to start (no pun intended) with the idea that the U.S. and Russia are making a real commitment to limit their own arsenals over time. Don’t expect Tehran and Pyongyang to bite on this immediately, but this is a decades-long project and New START is a good step in this direction.

4. “[W]e don’t need the treaty, we are willing to do these things unilaterally and the Russians will probably do it unilaterally themselves.” — Doug Feith, former Bush Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

Okay, fair enough…maybe both sides would do things unilaterally. But when I bought my house, I felt a lot better knowing the terms of the deal were actually written down. Feith spent a good chunk of his career negotiating arms control treaties for a living, so it’s curious why he’d slap down his former profession. Also, see #5 again.

3. “A friendly reality check for exuberant Democrats on the first day of the Nuclear-Zero Pax Obama — this treaty is almost certainly dead on arrival.” – Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard

Actually, Michael, I don’t think it is. Here‘s Sen. Richard Lugar (IN), the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee: ”I remain hopeful that it will be signed and that there will be time assigned on the floor for debate and a vote this year.” And here‘s Henry Kissinger and George Shultz supporting it, too. Ratification will be a tough fight — two-thirds of the Senate is needed — but it’s hardly DOA.

2. “Does anyone think that the Obama administration will use force — much less nuclear force — against Iran? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad certainly doesn’t, to judge by his reaction to the Nuclear Posture Review.” — Max Boot, Commentary

Actually, I think Ahmadinejad does. Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program over the last decade is the act of a country that’s convinced America would use force against it. After all, we’ve only invaded both of their next-door neighbors. Obama’s nuclear policy only isolates Iran more. Boot says that Robert Gates’ assertion that all options are on the table against Iran is not true. But actions speak louder than words. Judging by Iran’s actions, they still seem pretty convinced of America’s willingness to use force, Ahmadinejad’s bluster notwithstanding.

1. “(Our response is then restricted to bullets, bombs, and other conventional munitions.)” – Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post

Boasting more nonsense than a Phish show, Krauthammer’s piece imagines a scenario where hundreds of Americans are dead due to a nerve gas attack in Boston. Then he claims that the new Nuclear Posture Review ties the U.S. president’s hands because America couldn’t respond with a nuclear strike, and would have to — sigh – respond with just bullets, bombs and the like. Yeah, that’s right – apparently, the only good deterrent is a nuclear one. Really, why would anyone be scared of a conventional military that spends more on bullets, ICBMs and other conventional weapons than the rest of the world combined?

KickSTART to the 21st Century

Thursday, April 8th, 2010
Joseph Cirincione



Joseph Cirincione is the president of Ploughshares Fund and the author of Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons.

Alexandra Bell



Alexandra Bell is the project manager at Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow.

by Joseph Cirincione and Alexandra Bell

The president got a New START. Now he needs the Senate to ratify it.

This should be a no-brainer. When Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the treaty, dubbed New START, in Prague today, they were doing a lot more than concluding a dry, complex arms reduction agreement. The accord is a pragmatic and essential first step in strengthening American security.

The Cold War is over, but the weapons remain. Though we no longer fear global thermonuclear war between America and Russia, a nuclear explosion in an American city would be an unimaginable catastrophe. There are still 23,000 nuclear weapons held by nine different nations. Our military and security leaders agree: nuclear terrorism and the emergence of new nuclear states are the greatest threat to our nation. To prevent these threats we have to reduce the global stockpiles, secure all weapons material and block new nuclear-armed nations.

The New START treaty is part of the administration’s effort to develop a comprehensive national defense strategy that focuses on these 21st-century threats. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen gave his emphatic endorsement:

Through the trust it engenders, the cuts it requires, and the flexibility it preserves this treaty enhances our ability to do that which we have been charged to do: protect and defend the citizens of the United States.  I am as confident in its success as I am in its safeguards.

That is why this administration worked for a year to secure this follow-on to the 1991 START agreement, which was a legacy of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Those presidents knew, as did Nixon, Kennedy and Eisenhower before them, that sustained attention to arms control reductions made the U.S. stronger and safer.

The New START will make this country more secure in several ways. It lowers the limits on deployed strategic bombs to levels not seen since the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. It also establishes a cutting-edge verification process that allows us to track Russia’s nuclear activities and verify their reductions. Our intelligence agencies will enjoy enhanced monitoring capabilities that will give them greater knowledge of Russian nuclear forces and plans.

We will also gain greater international stability. This treaty is a key step in gaining the global cooperation that we need to prevent nuclear terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons. It will also help us to box in hostile states like Iran and North Korea by clearly reaffirming the U.S.’s and Russia’s commitment to disarmament, and move other states to take the steps necessary to secure nuclear materials and block nuclear weapons trade and development — steps that are often expensive or cut against the commercial interests of many key nations.

A Bipartisan Issue – But Will We See Bipartisan Support?

This is why New START has broad, bipartisan support from former military and national security leaders. Former Republican Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and former Democratic Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) have lauded the treaty (PDF) as an important step.

But there are problems standing in the way of quick Senate action. For one thing, there are nuclear Neanderthals that remain inside the beltway, clinging to Cold War theories and strategies. And the partisan rancor in Washington has become almost radioactive, with cheap political point-scoring taking precedent over the business of governance. Remember that treaties need to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate — a heavy lift considering the political environment.

Can the U.S. Senate rise above the partisan bluster and Tea Party talking points and focus on what’s good for American national security? The New START is an integral part of a smart, strong and pragmatic nuclear policy plan. Senators should approve this treaty before they take off for summer vacation.

Iran Sanctions, Round 4

Monday, April 5th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

America’s hot-and-cold relationship with China just blew a little warmer. Last Wednesday, Beijing for the first time agreed to take part in drafting a UN Security Council resolution for new sanctions against Iran.

This would be the fourth round of UN sanctions aimed at pressuring Tehran to halt its nuclear program. So far, efforts to give those sanctions real bite have foundered on the implicit threat that China (and perhaps Russia) would veto them in the Security Council. Both countries have extensive economic ties with Iran, and China, invoking its own unhappy experience with European imperialism, traditionally has championed “non-interference” in other countries’ internal affairs.

So it may be significant that, having tried and largely failed to “engage” Iran on the nuclear standoff, the White House has apparently successfully engaged China to deepen Tehran’s international isolation. But there are already signs that Beijing is not quite ready to jump this particular Rubicon.

Iran’s nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, wasted no time in jetting off to Beijing for meetings with Chinese officials. “Many issues came up in talks on which China accepted Iran’s position,” Jalili told reporters. “We jointly emphasized during our talks that these sanctions tools have lost their effectiveness.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that offered no hint that Beijing has changed its attitude toward Iran’s drive for nuclear capabilities, instead calling on all parties to “step up diplomatic efforts, and show flexibility, to create the conditions to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation.”

All this suggests we’re in for protracted haggling in the Security Council over language that, in the end, probably won’t induce the Islamic Republic to stop enriching uranium in defiance of UN strictures. The fundamental problem is not that China is indifferent to nuclear proliferation or intent on “protecting” a valuable trading partner. The fundamental problem is that China doesn’t seem ready yet to assume the responsibilities of global leadership, as we would define them.

From Sudan to Iran, China puts the amoral pursuit of its own interests – in these cases, assuring access to the energy it needs to fuel its rapid growth – ahead of larger conceptions of international cooperation and order, or even its own undoubted interest in stemming nuclear proliferation. The idea of “enlightened self-interest” that underpins U.S. internationalism has an unnatural and vaguely sinister ring to officials in the Middle Kingdom. For now at least, it’s hard to imagine the historically self-contained and inward-looking Middle Kingdom spending trillions of renminbi, say, to support a Pacific analogue to NATO, or an architecture of international institutions dedicated to collective problem-solving.

The Obama administration nonetheless deserves credit for nudging Beijing toward an outward view of global obligations commensurate with its growing geopolitical weight. But in the crunch – pressuring Iran to forsake nuclear weapons – we’d do well to have realistic expectations of how far China is really prepared to go.