Posts Tagged ‘ Middle East ’

Why We Are Watching This Clown

Wednesday, February 2nd, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

I normally try to stay away from this stuff, but the latest Glenn Beck blaze of paranoia on Egypt is just too much of a train wreck to miss. In 12 terrifying minutes, Beck outlines the contours of a Middle East that is ON FIRE, and promises to devote the next several episodes to giving his viewers the whole TRUTH, the TRUTH that “has no agenda,” the TRUTH that the mainstream media doesn’t want to tell you.

“I’m not going to give you the two minute sound-byte,” teases Beck. “I’m not going to treat you like you’re a moron. I’m going to treat you like you really do want to understand what’s going on in the world.”

Okay, we all know he’s crazy. But what I keep trying to understand, every time I catch a glimpse of Beck, is why do 2.5 or 3 million people tune in to watch this guy every night? Clearly, he’s figured something out. And as amusing as it is to gawk at the loop-de-loops of insanity, there’s got to be some deep psychological nerves that he’s satisfying.

Let me offer three hypotheses:

  1. The puzzle-solving boost. The neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran writes that “we are hard-wired to love solving puzzles.” In particular, we seem to most enjoy solving puzzles with sudden flashes of insight, “Aha” moments that give us a little flash of positive good feeling. This probably explains the appeal of conspiracy theories generally. Everybody loves a good mystery. And Beck’s most disturbing moments are kind of like that: he throws a bunch of oddly-sized puzzle pieces on the floor, and then promises to show how they will all fit together in an instant “aha” moment. It’s like puzzle-solving porn.
  2. The smarter than everyone else boost. What Beck is consciously doing is letting his viewers in on something exclusive, some privileged view of the world that allows them to feel superior to those who aren’t in the know. These are viewers who have probably spent much of their lives feeling intellectually insecure. But by providing a simple, secret explanation for what’s going on the world, Beck is peddling an ego boost.
  3. Anxiety needs some respect. Beck’s rants are fear-driven, and in that respect they must resonate with a sense of unease that seems to be plaguing too many Americans these days. But this is especially dangerous. Risk expert David Ropeik writes that “when it comes to perceiving and responding to danger, human brains are hard-wired to fear first, and think later.” Beck’s rants are fear-driven, and once the fear part of the brain is activated, the logic part of the brain just doesn’t function as well.

So, add it up, and what Glenn Beck is offering millions of anxious viewers is a chance to validate their fears and then illogically salve them by providing the psychological high of solving a puzzle that allows them to feel superior by being privileged to some secret, exclusive knowledge.

I’m not sure what the antidote is, but I’m guessing it’s not simply marginalizing Beck for his craziness, fun and ego-boosting as that may be. I do sincerely believe that the conspiratorial fear-mongering that comes out of the Beck empire is a serious, serious problem for our society, but it also taps into some serious psychological needs out there. More to think about here.

Obama and Human Rights in the Middle East

Friday, January 28th, 2011
Andrew Albertson



Andrew Albertson is the former Executive Director of the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Fellow at the Truman National Security Project.

by Andrew Albertson

Events over the last few weeks demand a reconsideration, if not a full-scale reevaluation of the wisdom of the Obama administration’s overall approach to democracy and human rights in the Middle East.

Facts are stubborn things, and the reality is that President Obama’s administration has now succeeded where President Bush never did. On his watch, Tunisia’s people rose up in protest over economic corruption and government repression and a dictator fled. The Arab world has a fighting chance at establishing its first true democracy.

At a minimum, those on the right who incessantly take credit wherever freedom blossoms need to grapple with that fact. But even more than that may be called for.

The Obama administration’s approach has not always been perfect, but it does appear, for the most part, rather consistent. And it does appear to have helped. It combines a steady rhetorical insistence on universal principles with an attempt, not always successful, to avoid lending its political support to either governments or protesters—betting on both and neither at the same time—event at times of crisis for regimes.

With events heating up in Egypt, the Obama Administration has done nothing to impede—and in fact has amplified—Egyptians’ calls for change.

With regard to events in Tunisia, Clinton was even more direct. Just days before Ben Ali fled the country, with his government grasping for support, she refused to throw him a rope, telling Al Arabiya: “We are not taking sides.”

Most importantly, the Obama administration has called on the governments of Egypt and Tunisia to respect the rights of peaceful protesters and to refrain from violence. This is by far the most valuable stance the U.S. can take in this moment of instability. An Tiananmen-style crackdown in Cairo’s Tahrir Square would have devastating consequences for Egyptians and Americans alike.

The toughest part has yet to come: Todays’s protests in Egypt are likely to be larger than the ones on Tuesday, and Tunisia has yet to consolidate anything resembling a democratic government. But so far, we have to commend the Obama administration’s approach to both Tunisia and Egypt.

Lessons From Tunisia

Friday, January 21st, 2011
Jordan Michael Smith



Jordan Michael Smith is writing a book on U.S.-Israeli relations. He’s written for The Atlantic, The Boston Globe and Foreign Policy

by Jordan Michael Smith

With Tunisia calming down, it is worth reflecting on what the events might mean for us here in the good ol’ US of A.

The first point is that the Obama administration struck precisely the right balance between offering encouragement to the protesters and avoiding interfering in Tunisian internal matters. It is not quite true, as Andrew Sullivan implies, that Obama said nothing about the upheaval. The President released a statement saying he applauds Tunisians’ strength and dignity in standing up to corruption, an important comment that showed that America would not block the will of the Tunisian people. Nationalism is a powerful force in the modern world, and opposing it in now Tunisia would be a disastrous decision.

But neither is it true that the administration inserted itself into the equation, the way Abe Greenwald and others wanted it to. The Obama-ites kept their profile deliberately low, wary of making American support the issue that could be blamed for fomenting the revolution in a part of the world deeply suspicious of U.S. intervention. Unlike Greenwald et al., the administration understands that Tunisians hardly need the assent of an American president before bravely taking, or continuing, action. If anything, Tunisians would be wary of interference from a U.S. president that had praised the strong relations between the nations.

Second, the fact that America let an Arab dictator it supported fall will not go unnoticed. One of Al Qaeda’s major grievances with the U.S. is that America supports autocratic, corrupt, “un-Islamic” regimes like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. In the 1990s, senior Al Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden, became (wrongly) convinced that it was U.S. power that was allowing these regimes to remain in power. As scholar Fawaz A. Gerges writes in his essential book The Far Enemy, bin Laden “considered Saudi Arabia an occupied country and its regime incapable of forcing the Americans out.” Gerges continues: “[H]e declared war on the United States, not on Saudi Arabia, because, as he told his cohorts, once the United States is expelled from the area, its local clients would fall like ripened fruits.” For Al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri the country in question was Egypt, but the logic was the same. The “near enemy” was propped up by “the far enemy,” America.

It will therefore be of great interest to Arabs and Muslims—and hardly just Al-Qaeda—that in fact America does not unconditionally support local despots. Should regime opponents emerge that are not inimical to American interests, the U.S. will not eternally stand in their way.

The real question is what lesson will be taken away from this. Will it be that America is in fact not behind the region’s many woes, that the U.S. is not the far enemy? Or rather, conversely, will it be that the U.S. will support tyrants until the Arab people rise up and cast them off? The two are not mutually exclusive, of course. One can imagine both becoming internalized by Middle Easterners in the coming days.

The Emerging Crisis in Lebanon

Thursday, January 13th, 2011
Jordan Michael Smith



Jordan Michael Smith is writing a book on U.S.-Israeli relations. He’s written for The Atlantic, The Boston Globe and Foreign Policy

by Jordan Michael Smith

While the nation’s attention focuses on Tucson, a crisis emerges in Lebanon. Hezbollah, a member of the Lebanese governing coalition since a deal brokered in 2008 by President Michel Suleiman— has pulled out of the government coalition.  The move is in anticipation of the results of the UN-backed inquiry into the death of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which is expected to find Hezbollah members implicated in his murder. This is the first time a Lebanese coalition government has collapsed under pressure from resignations, a dangerous first in a country that was wracked by a brutal civil war in the 1980s. The ethnic-religious balance of power is precarious in Beirut, with Hezbollah representing the Shi’ite Muslims from the South.

All of this shows the problem with the Bush administration’s reckless democracy promotion in 2005 and 2006. The administration was quick to hold up the rallies in the wake of Hariri’s murder as the best example of the new post-Iraq Middle East, a future filled with democratic pluralism and rule of law. Lebanon “can serve as a great example (to other countries) of what is possible in the Middle East,” President Bush said.

But there was no follow-up, no larger strategy beyond supporting the UN tribunal.

The administration never had a plan for how to make Hezbollah disappear, save for giving Israel time to crush it in the 2006 war. The reality is that Hezbollah has a strong base in parts of the country, making the terrorist group-cum-political party impossible to excise without upending the country’s fragile balance.

Which is why promoting democracy from afar is so difficult. Local actors can always undermine the master plans of outside powers, and people living in any given country often have as much to fear from instability as they do from illiberalism. The Lebanese people seem to want justice. But not at the cost of further bloodshed.

The Obama administration is continuing on this risky path. Secretary Clinton accused Hezbollah of trying to wreck the UN probe by resigning from the government. She is surely correct, but the Iranian-sponsored group is not going to simply back down. And so there is a stand-off of sorts, with the U.S. and its allies on one side, Hezbollah and Iran on the other, and the majority of Lebanese people in the middle.

The worst outcome of all for the U.S. would be more violence. The best bet is to continue with the Syrian-Saudi attempts at mediation, which hopefully can find some solution that allows both sides to save face while preserving stability.

CyberSecurity: Preventing The Next 9/11

Monday, September 13th, 2010
Sarah Granger



Sarah Granger is a fellow at the Truman National Security Project. She is an editor and contributor to four books on computer security and the founder of PublicEdge, which advises progressive organizations on new media.

by Sarah Granger

I remember the feeling I had when first visiting Pearl Harbor, and again years later when flying into Manhattan just after September 11, 2001. There’s an eerie quietness about the ships buried underwater, and I still see the faces of people I met in the World Trade Center.

We were warned about those attacks. We may not have known the exact details, but in retrospect, we could have done more – much more – to prevent them. Today, we face a similar threat in cyberspace.
While we don’t know the exact details, we know something is coming, and the devastation could be far more deadly.

A cyber attack – by terrorists or a state – could look like sudden power outages, scrambled data in financial systems, air traffic accidents, water contamination, and mass media propaganda about all of the above. All of this can be done on computers from halfway across the globe. We’ve already seen examples of it – tests, so to speak – in other countries and within smaller networks. In 2008, Russian hackers took down Georgian government websites in an effort to throw off the administration during turf conflicts. Hundreds of Lithuanian servers went down earlier in the year in a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack also by Russian hackers flexing their muscles in protest of the law banning public display of Soviet era artifacts. According to U.S. government sources, other countries have seen attacks on their power grids.

The nightmare scenario could involve air strikes with no warning systems enabled, missiles arriving from unknown origins. Dirty bombs could get through port security as logic bombs crush the remaining networks. Meanwhile, with financial systems crippled and damaged infrastructure, panic would ensue and local governments would be ill-equipped to deal with so many simultaneous problems. We could find ourselves with multiple major cities suffering from Katrina-like aftermaths – massive numbers of homeless, injured, without power or resources, while looters take to the streets.

Though no terrorist organization is yet known to have this capacity, most experts say we have less than five years before the first major cyber attack on U.S. soil. In a recent meeting with Senator Kirsten Gillibrand , she told a group of bloggers she thought five years would be a generous timeline. We know hacker cells operating in Russia and China already have the skills and the tools necessary, as do some in the Middle East. Terrorists may be next.

Over the past year, the Obama administration and the Pentagon have begun to take the issue more seriously, appointing a new White House Cyber Security Advisor and establishing the U.S. Cyber Command. While this marks a dramatic improvement, it is far from enough. We know logic bombs have already been placed into critical networks but what we don’t know is: when will they explode? And who put them there?

Fortunately, some members of Congress are working to address the situation. Both S. 1438, Fostering a Global Response to Cyber Attacks Act (Gillibrand) and S. 3193, International Cyberspace and Cybersecurity Coordination Act of 2010 (Kerry) address the international coordination necessary to seek and obstruct attackers. This is an important step in both preventing attacks and bringing the perpetrators to justice, although another more aggressive strategy of pre-emptive reactions to attacker stands on shaky legal ground.

We also must ready our military Cyber Command. Captain Daryl Hancock of the U.S. Fleet CYBERCOM (U.S. Navy 10th Fleet) spoke about their progress at the International Conference on Cyber Security recently, emphasizing they will be operational on schedule for next month. Still, we need more resources to manage future threats. H.R. 4061, The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010 (Lipinsky) and S. 773, The Cybersecurity Act of 2009 (Rockefeller & Snowe), attempt to address this, but training thousands of people to act as first responders to cyber attacks that could come in a variety of forms takes time and resources.

Since the Internet resides on a network of nodes owned and operated by a wide range of entities, our security rests in the hands of many people. Developing a nationwide attitude of awareness and preparation will reduce the likelihood that a large-scale cyber attack will have lasting consequences like the disasters of the past. We have the opportunity now to reduce the possible destruction that could result from these attacks. It’s in our hands, and in the hands of those who represent us.

Photo credit: The Egglepant

Israel’s National Mindset

Thursday, July 15th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

“Is America really Israel’s ally? You think so? We’re not so sure.” An Israeli Defense Force reservist said this to me during a post-dinner drink on a deck overlooking the captivating Sea of Galilee last week.

My response was curt — “You better start believing it. Otherwise, you’re screwed.” Okay, perhaps that wasn’t terribly “PC” and perhaps my tone did little to convince him. After all, my reservist friend wasn’t particularly predisposed towards diplomatic nuance — he opposed any peace deal whatsoever.

However, the sentiment he expressed — that Israel is alone, that it has been abandoned and that it can only count on itself — is deeply embedded in Israel’s national psyche. I’m not here to argue whether this world-view is correct, but like it or not, it’s important to recognize that it exists, and that it lies at the heart of many Israeli foreign policy decisions.

It was hardly just one IDF reservist that tingled my spidey-sense. A top-level Israeli ex-peace negotiator was even more explicit: “Are we paranoid? Yes.” The IDF soldier based along the “blue line” separating Israel and Lebanon believed what UNIFIL — the UN’s peacekeeping force along the border — was doing “is not sufficient” to protect Israel.

The former peace negotiator went on to recount a meeting with a well-known European newspaper’s editorial board. When the board asked what the Israeli government disliked about the newspaper’s writing style, he responded succinctly: “To be sure comma,” a phrase that typically starts the sentence that ends with, “Israel has the right to defend itself.”

That caveat –“To be sure, Israel has the right to defend itself” – is standard fare among American and European opinion columns that go on to criticize Israeli actions. From his perspective, that disclaim glosses over the threats Israel lives under — international terrorist groups in southern Lebanon and Gaza bent on firing rockets and sending suicide bombers into his country, coupled with the stress of a perpetually unstable region, and Iran’s repeated threats of Israeli destruction. His point was: that in Washington, London or Paris, it’s easy to discount the seriousness (would it really make sense for Iran to attack?), scale and immediacy of these threats as these cities don’t live under them every day.

But in Israeli eyes, these threats loom larger. That’s what drove Israel’s unapologetic heavy hand in the 2nd Lebanon War, in Operation Cast Lead, and during the flotilla incident when so many Palestinian civilians were killed in the fighting. Israel is prepared to endure the resulting international condemnation, because civilian causalities and a soiled reputation are lesser evils when compared with looming national security threats, “It’s us or them, and I’d rather it be them. We can’t count on anyone else, so we’ll do it ourselves.”

In short, Israel is banking on military victories to create the appearance of invincibility. Israel reasons that, if the Arab countries believe they can defeat Israel militarily, why then would the Arabs be interested in a peace agreement. Yet that sentiment lands Israel in a catch-22 — if Israel appears militarily invincible, then why negotiate peace? The answer is, of course, that the longer conflict drags on, the higher the cost of appearing invincible will be — in lives, resources, and reputation.

Israel shouldn’t be given a pass for its heavy-handed actions, particularly ones that needlessly take the lives of innocent civilian bystanders. But understanding Israel’s conflicted inner-monologue is a critical component in brokering a lasting peace.

Photo credit: Hoyasmeg’s Photostream

Iran Sends Its Own Gaza-Bound Flotilla

Monday, June 7th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Over the weekend, Iran’s foreign ministry decided it would be a peach of an idea to send an Iranian Red Crescent flotilla to Gaza. If the flotilla reaches the shores off Gaza — and check out a Middle East map and you’ll see that Tehran is going to need some “local help” so it doesn’t have to head around the Horn of Africa — it could create an international firestorm that makes the fallout from the first flotilla look like a three-year-old’s birthday party.

To the casual observer, the Iranian Red Crescent may seem like a harmless international charity intent on do-gooding. It is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the world’s largest humanitarian network.

But lest anyone think the Iranian Red Crescent is an independent charity that has made a humanitarian decision to send the flotilla to Gaza out of the goodness of its heart, click here. That’s the Google translation of the announcement of Abolhassan Faghih’s appointment as the Iranian Red Crescent’s president by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. What’s more, the decision to send the flotilla was likely made within the halls of the Iranian foreign ministry in Tehran. Does that sound independent? Indeed, it’s almost certain that Ahmadinejad is using this flotilla as a direct extension of Iranian foreign policy.

And if the situation isn’t handled with extraordinary deftness, it could just spark a war.

Imagine the scenario: An Iranian-backed flotilla attempts to capitalize on the public relations “success” of last week’s tragedy. Israel, having dug its heels in on the naval blockade while sending mixed messages on the humanitarian issue, calculates that the last thing in the world it needs is to hand Iran a propaganda victory. After all, the Israel Defense Force just took out a handful of alleged terrorist divers off Gaza, which is a fair indication that the beating they’ve taken in the international press after last week isn’t going to make them back down.

In the face of impending physical confrontation, Tehran, as we’ve seen far too often over the last year, has little concern for the lives of its own citizens and encourages the flotilla onward. Israel fires. Tehran responds. The situation escalates … you can imagine the ugly fallout.

For the mullahs in Tehran, the situation is a win-win no-brainer. Either breaking the Israeli blockade or having its citizens die at Tel Aviv’s hands would be a massive propaganda victory that could potentially rally disaffected Iranians around the president. And if the situation becomes violent and Iran looks like a victim, it could decrease pressure within the UN Security Council for nuclear sanctions.

If we look purely at the strategic implications of the Red Crescent flotilla, the only way to diffuse the situation is to make aid in Gaza a non-issue. That’s why in light of the obvious humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza’s citizens, Israel needs to facilitate a massive injection of aid into the strip.

And it better do it quickly. After all, were Iran to somehow fail, someone else would just send another flotilla soon.

Photo credit: Indigoprime’s Photostream

Avoiding a Rush to Judgment on the Israeli Flotilla Attack

Tuesday, June 1st, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Much of the world has reacted harshly against Israel in the wake of the tragic loss of life in this weekend’s flotilla incident. While the optics certainly look terrible for Tel Aviv, it’s critical that we avoid a rush to judgment. Two things need to take place first: one, an inquiry insuring that we have all the information we need about the incident; and two, a full consideration of the geopolitical issues in play.

Open questions remain about what led up to the horrific results, questions that need to be answered before any fair evaluation can be made. A partial list includes: Did the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) follow standard procedures to attempt to divert the flotilla as it had others? Was the flotilla given proper warning of the impending boarding? Were other non-lethal diversionary methods (such as water cannons, sound blasts, attempts to escort the ship out of the immediate area) deployed? Once the decision was made to board the ship, did IDF members on board first use non-lethal methods? Were there specific acts that caused the IDF to switch to live ammunition?

A thorough investigation may well prove that the IDF’s use of deadly force was indeed disproportionate. But learning the answers to these questions is critical before establishing that judgment.

A discussion should also take place on the legal and moral justifications for Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. The blockade has been going on for approximately two years, and Israel has justified it on grounds that Hamas could get the weapons via international shipping.

Israel’s right to defend itself is not in question. And though Gaza is not a sovereign state, Israel claims that the blockade is justified because it is at war with Hamas, the group that controls Gaza.

But the effect of the blockade on civilians in Gaza has been severe. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has condemned the blockade not on security grounds but humanitarian ones, saying it has caused “unacceptable suffering.” And the Gladstone Report, the UN’s analysis that followed the late-2008 Israeli invasion of Gaza, found that Israel’s blockade exacerbated humanitarian needs, particularly food, economic recovery and public heath.

Israel claims that it was prepared to take the flotilla’s humanitarian goods, inspect them and send them on to Gaza. But regardless of the shipment’s fate, Gaza’s citizens desperately need more, and Israel should reorient the blockade to focus on weapons while proactively facilitating humanitarian assistance. Besides, the incident has already prompted Egypt to open its border with Gaza, demonstrating that there is a limit to Israel’s ability to rope the region off.

It’s important to understand why the flotilla was out there in the first place: not to deliver aid to Gaza, but to make a political point about the blockade’s existence. It’s equally important to note that the flotilla had to provoke Israel in order to make the political point resonate with a wider audience. Israel has to learn not to play into its opponents’ hands.

Any loss of life is tragic, and whatever the investigation turns up will not change the fact that nine individuals have been needlessly killed. But we must understand the specific circumstances that led up to the incident, as well as its wider geopolitical context, before levying judgment.

Photo credit: freegazaorg’s Photostream

Confronting Iran: The Case for Targeted Sanctions

Wednesday, April 28th, 2010
Pirooz Hamvatan



Pirooz Hamvatan is the pseudonym for a Washington, D.C.-based analyst focusing on Iranian domestic and security issues.

Ali K



Ali K is currently a business student in the U.S. and a supporter of Iran’s Green Movement who was severely beaten by the Basij militia during a peaceful demonstration in Tehran last year.

by Pirooz Hamvatan and Ali K

The following is a guest column from Pirooz Hamvatan, a pseudonym for a Washington, D.C.-based analyst focusing on Iranian domestic and security issues, and Ali K., currently a business student in the U.S. and a supporter of Iran’s Green Movement who was severely beaten by the Basij militia during a peaceful demonstration in Tehran last year.

Congress is on the verge of sending a petroleum sanctions bill to President Obama that has wide bipartisan support in Congress. But far from posing a serious challenge to the regime, the bill could in fact inadvertently undermine long-term U.S. interests by weakening the Iranian civil rights movement and strengthening President Ahmadinejad and his cronies.

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, currently in conference committee, will direct the president to impose sanctions on any entity providing Iran with “refined petroleum products” worth $200,000 or more per transaction, or $1 million per year. The bill defines refined petroleum products to include diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and aviation gasoline.

The new bill aims to cripple Iran’s economy in response to Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear program. But the sanctions being proposed are not the right answer. Such a sweeping measure would end up only hurting ordinary Iranians, especially the middle class that the U.S. must shore up to improve Iran’s chances for reform.

Instead, our top priority should be helping to increase the space for the Iranian civil rights movement. That means moving beyond the limited focus on “solving” the nuclear issue. An Iranian government that is more accountable to — and representative of — its moderate majority would not pose a security threat to the U.S. and its allies. Rather than heavy-handed sanctions, the Obama administration should consider restrictions that are more targeted, which would hit the ruling regime where it hurts, and increase the possibility of change from within.

The Wrong Path

Introduced in the House by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and in the Senate by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), the sanctions bill currently in conference aims to limit Iran’s access to gasoline in the hopes that the suffering population will pressure the regime to give in to Western demands. But if the end goal is to induce Iran to be a more responsible regional actor that doesn’t threaten U.S. security interests, then petroleum sanctions are likely to achieve the opposite effect.

Just look at the experience of the last couple of decades. In 1995, in response to Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology and support of terrorism, President Clinton issued two executive orders prohibiting American investment in Iran’s energy sector and banning U.S. imports of most Iranian goods. The following year, Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (PDF), calling for sanctions on foreign firms investing more than $20 million per year in Iran’s energy sector. Although such measures have impeded the development of Iran’s economy, they have not caused the Islamic Republic to change course on its nuclear program or its funding of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In fact, in order to achieve their foreign policy and domestic goals, Iran’s leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to let the Iranian people suffer.

Just as important, history has shown that crippling sanctions undermine the middle class — the very people who are the backbone of civil society and the voices of moderation. International sanctions on Iraq weakened its population, making them more reliant on, and more vulnerable to, Saddam Hussein’s regime. Gasoline sanctions on Iran could have a similar effect, exacerbating inflation, lowering the quality of life for the middle class and pushing more people below the poverty line.

Gasoline sanctions would also distract Iranians from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s own mismanagement of the economy — an important issue mobilizing people around the Green Movement — and divert blame to the U.S. Iran is already facing a 20-percent inflation rate, a crippled domestic industry, unemployment of over 11 percent (with 24 percent of 15-to-24 year-olds unemployed), and one of the worst rates of brain drain in the world. Many Iranians are still seething over the fact that, since becoming president in 2005, Ahmadinejad squandered unprecedented oil revenues that the Islamic Republic accrued as a result of high world oil prices. Amid all of this, Ahmadinejad has backed a controversial measure that would phase out government subsidies on gasoline and is likely to increase inflation. The Iranian people are already facing enough hardship without the U.S. adding to their woes and diminishing the pro-American sentiments of a wide array of Iranians.

Nor will the sanctions loosen the regime’s grip on power. Ahmadinejad’s faction would, in fact, fare better than the majority of the populace. Masters of smuggling, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members would still be able to bring in gasoline through Iran’s porous borders, perversely enriching themselves even more.

The Right Path

But if broad sanctions are a heavy-handed tool that could only risk the development of Iran’s civil rights movement, what options do U.S. policy makers have to challenge the regime?

A preferred approach would be something more targeted against those responsible for Iran’s actions: the members of the ruling regime. Congress should consider the following:

  • Pass a bill calling on the U.S. State Department to identify Iranian human rights abusers (primarily from within the Revolutionary Guards; the Basij, the regime’s volunteer militia; and the judiciary) and impose travel bans on them. The bill should also seek the cooperation of our allies in enforcing the ban as widely as possible and place pressure on key countries like Dubai to block entry to these individuals. The list of targeted offenders should be made public in order to show the Iranian people that the U.S. is on their side.
  • Pass a measure calling for human rights abusers’ assets to be frozen. Because Iranian officials have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from the U.S. financial system, the U.S. Treasury may not have much of a role to play here. Rather, such a measure would simply be a first step in convincing banks in Europe and the United Arab Emirates — where many regime insiders’ assets are squirreled away — to enforce restrictions.

What specific effect will travel bans have on hardline officials and their mid-ranking employees? Besides being a major inconvenience, it would hurt their pocketbooks. This is because a large number of these individuals have side-businesses in which they smuggle goods from places like Dubai, Thailand, Indonesia and Syria — buying, for example, electronic goods and bringing them back to Iran through Revolutionary Guard-controlled customs stations without having to pay import duties. They then sell these goods at highly marked-up prices in the isolated Iranian market. A strictly enforced travel ban — including on individuals working for these human rights abusers’ front companies — would close off a lucrative source of income.

To be clear, the overall intent of this plan is not necessarily to deal a significant economic blow to the entire hardline establishment — that would be next to impossible. Neither will it convince, in the short term, current Iranian leaders to change course on the nuclear program — no outside pressure will. Rather the strategy is to increase the disincentives for individuals to participate in or condone oppressive behavior, with the goal of helping the Green Movement flourish.

At the same time, it is important not to target certain high level officials who may have the capacity to play a role in moving Iran toward reform. For instance, while it may be justified to sanction Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani for allowing hardliners to abuse Iran’s legal system to persecute reformers, his brother Ali Larijani — the pragmatic conservative Speaker of Parliament and bitter Ahmadinejad rival — has not been complicit in human rights abuses, and thus should not be snared by the sanctions net. This nuanced targeting will send a signal to the regime’s officials that they will be left alone if they refrain from abusing their fellow citizens.

Moreover, certain Iranian leaders are sensitive to international accusations of human rights abuses. This is not for altruistic reasons, but because they want the Islamic Republic to be seen as a role model to the Islamic world, and not simply another run-of-the-mill Middle Eastern dictatorship.

To be sure, human rights sanctions alone may not alleviate the pressure currently being placed on Iran’s Green Movement. Regime hardliners could blame the U.S. for fomenting post-election unrest and paint Iran’s dissidents as Western spies. Republican Guard members and Basijis could continue their human rights abuses regardless of travel bans and asset freezes. But that is the status quo in Iran. There is little cost to the U.S. if human rights sanctions don’t work — and much to gain if they do.

A Broader, Pro-Reform Agenda

Human rights sanctions are not a silver bullet. They will not bring the regime to its knees. But neither will gasoline sanctions. Fortunately, it appears that the Obama administration is asking Congress to slow down its push for unilateral gasoline sanctions as the U.N. Security Council deliberates over its own sanctions during the next few months. Meanwhile, targeted sanctions against human rights abusers is being pushed by Sen. John McCain, though not as stand-alone legislation but as an amendment to the flawed gas sanctions bill.

A human rights sanctions package can be an effective part of a broader effort to help Iran’s Green Movement chart its own course toward a better future for Iranians. Other essential pieces to this strategy would include:

  • Rep. Jim Moran’s (D-VA) Iranian Digital Empowerment Act, which seeks to help get information-sharing software and filter-breaking technology into the hands of Iranian reformers.
  • Rep. Keith Ellison’s (D-MN) Stand With the Iranian People Act, which (in addition to calling for human rights abusers to be sanctioned) calls for suspension of U.S. government funding to entities that sell censorship and surveillance equipment to the regime, and seeks to ease restrictions on American charities that want to work in Iran.

Bills focusing on the Islamic Republic’s human rights abuses have an excellent chance of passing in Congress because they are politically appealing — they help legislators look tough on national security while promoting American values of freedom and democracy. Moreover, they avoid the danger that is inherent with sweeping economic sanctions: that of harming the people they were intended to help.

Moreover, U.S. passage of human rights sanctions could lead allies in Europe to follow suit. Although the U.N. Security Council is unlikely to do so — China and Russia are adamantly opposed to interfering in others’ domestic affairs — if the U.S. and European allies banded together to pressure countries like Dubai to enforce travel bans, sanctions would have a greater chance of success.

In the end, it is important to remember that the members of the Green Movement are fighting for reform within the Islamic Republic system. Their demands include an independent electoral commission, the release of all political prisoners and freedom of speech. Acknowledging that it is up to the Iranian people to chart their own course, the U.S. can best protect its own security interests by helping to level the playing field in Iran, allowing the moderate, peace-loving majority of Iranians to continue their journey toward a better future for their country and the broader Middle East.

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Earth Day and Energy Security

Thursday, April 22nd, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Throughout the progressive blogosphere, Earth Day generates tons of buzz as like-minded liberals gather in chat rooms and on message boards for an annual rally to protect Mother Earth. Re-energizing (pun intended) focus on the environment in the wake of a so-so Copenhagen Summit is a worthy endeavor, of course, but it can sometimes feel like preaching to the choir.

Meanwhile, the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman bill is languishing in the Senate with little hope of movement before November’s elections. And despite its tri-partisan co-sponsorship, conservatives continue to insist on peddling the notion that climate change and Santa Claus share more than a melting polar ice cap. Meanwhile, their supporters continue to buy it, grasping at incontrovertible “proof” like leaked emails from Cambridge.

While the right is intent on pretending climate change doesn’t exist, there’s one aspect of it that’s getting tougher and tougher to ignore: energy security. Not everyone believes that the earth is warming, but most eagerly accept the idea that America should be buying less gasoline from the Middle East. The most credible messenger is the military — the one organization whose mission demands that it become more energy efficient.

Late last year, my PPI colleague Mike Signer wrote a piece on the topic for U.S. News. Here’s what he said:

[T]he most innovative and effective actors in the carbon-reduction arena bear zero resemblance to this outdated cartoon. No hemp-wearing hippies here: Today, it’s the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard who are aggressively pursuing plans for sustainable energy, reducing carbon, and achieving energy independence.

It’s no mystery why: Our armed men and women are truly the point of the spear. The services aren’t motivated just by the “soft power” of moral authority or the pursuit of idealism for its own sake. It’s in fact “hard power” concerns—the security of our troops, the economic independence of our energy supply, and the long-term need to better control the geopolitical implications of climate change—that have driven the military to take the lead.

Consider the facts. Today, an infantry soldier on a three-day mission in Afghanistan carries over 25 pounds of batteries to charge his equipment, hampering his maneuverability and can even causing muscular-skeletal injuries. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have suffered chilling casualties guarding convoys of trucks carrying oil. Meanwhile, every $10 increase in the price of oil translates into a $1.3 billion increase in the Pentagon’s operating costs.

In all of these cases, clean energy and efficiency programs would not only help reduce our carbon output and achieve energy efficiency; they would directly increase the effectiveness of our military.

Remember in the summer of 2008 when the price of a gallon of gas ran to a shocking $4? Well, multiply that by 100 — literally — to get cost of a gallon every day in Afghanistan. By the time you add the transportation price and supply losses from attacked convoys, the Pentagon estimates that fuel costs the American taxpayer $400 a gallon. And much of that $400/gallon is put in Abrams tanks that get… wait for it… just over a half-mile to the gallon. Ergo, one mile in an Abrams tank costs about $700.

The good news is that organizations like Operation Free — a group of military veterans who recognize the life and death nature of fuel efficiency – are traveling the country to promote the policies that will improve our energy security. So whether or not you “buy” climate change – and frankly, you really should — it’s tough to argue against a military that is trying to cut the tether to carbon-based fuels that hamper mission effectiveness. Focusing on this aspect of the issue may well be the best bipartisan way to move public opinion on reducing the use of carbon-based fuels.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/ / CC BY 2.0

Four Things Obama Needs to Do in the Middle East

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010
Shadi Hamid



Shadi Hamid is the deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

by Shadi Hamid

In a recent piece, I discussed the growing sense of “Bush nostalgia” among Arab reformers. Such nostalgia has less to do with George W. Bush and more to do with the period of democratic promise the Middle East experienced in 2004-5, partly a result of aggressive, but short-lived, efforts to put pressure on authoritarian regimes.

For its part, the Obama administration has shown little real interest in democratization in the Arab world, falling back on the “pragmatic” neo-realism of the Clinton and first Bush administrations. Compared to the destructive policies of his predecessor, President Obama’s approach seems a breath of fresh air. But his foreign policy vision, while certainly sensible, has so far been remarkably conventional and unimaginative. Perhaps that’s what was initially needed. Now, however, is the time for bolder, more creative policy making. Here are four things Obama can – and should – do in the Middle East to advance U.S. interests and ideals:

  • Recognize the region’s changing balance of power. Traditional allies like Egypt and Jordan (two of the world’s largest U.S. aid recipients) are losing influence. Increasingly authoritarian, erratic and perceived as excessively pro-American, they have little credibility with Arab audiences. On the other hand, emerging powers like Turkey and Qatar are pursuing independent foreign policies and maintaining positive relations with both the West and the “rejectionist” camp (Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah). Not surprisingly, both countries, seen as “honest brokers,” have played a major role in mediating regional conflicts and supporting dialogue efforts, including on the Syrian-Israeli, Israeli-Palestinian, Hamas-Fatah and internal Lebanese tracks. The U.S. should encourage their efforts, keeping in mind that they may be uniquely well-positioned to exert influence on Iran and Syria.
  • Promote Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey is the closest thing the Middle East has to a “model,” one of only two countries in the world led by a democratically elected Islamist party. According to a 2009 survey, 64 percent of Arab respondents in seven countries believe “Turkey’s EU membership prospects make Turkey an attractive partner for reform in the Arab world.” Considering its growing regional importance, the U.S. cannot afford for Turkey to turn inward and become embroiled in conflict between its secularist military and Islamist-leaning government. For a time, Turkey’s desire to join the EU provided incentives to implement wide-ranging legal and political reforms. However, as the EU drags its feet on accession talks, and Turks lose hope in EU membership, the reform process looks less encouraging than ever. Turkey must, however, remain enmeshed in Western institutions and partnerships. The Obama administration should use its leverage with European allies to ensure the accession process moves forward.
  • Begin strategic engagement with nonviolent Islamist groups. In most Arab countries, Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, are the largest, most influential opposition groups. But Obama has so far failed to engage them, despite his emphasis on “dialogue” with diverse actors. Engagement would serve several purposes, discussed in detail here, including information-gathering, improving our credibility with Arab publics and putting pressure on autocratic regimes to open up. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or another senior official, could begin by giving a major speech on the U.S. and political Islam (something which the Clinton administration did on several occasions), stating unequivocally that the U.S. will accept democratic outcomes, even if that means the election of Islamist parties. The State Department should also issue a directive explicitly permitting State Department employees, including ambassadors in the region, to meet with and incorporate members of Islamist organizations in their programming.
  • Embrace “positive conditionality.” The U.S. gives hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Arab authoritarian regimes. Rather than cutting aid, which is unlikely to be politically viable, the U.S. could offer large packages in additional assistance, conditioned on meeting a series of explicit benchmarks on democratization. If the country failed to meet these benchmarks, the aid would be withheld and carried over to a reform “endowment” for the next fiscal year. This way, the more governments rejected the aid, the greater the incentive would be to accept it in future years.

None of these four “steps” are particularly revolutionary. But that’s the point: the Obama administration could take action immediately – if it had the political will. With the troop drawdown in Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear threat, there may be a temptation to wait for a better time. But, in the Middle East, the better time, sadly, never seems to come.

If anything, a confluence of factors appears to be converging, suggesting the time to act is now. There are critical elections in Egypt and Jordan coming up in 2010 (and 2011). For the first time in Egypt, there is an inspiring national figure, Mohamed ElBaradei, who seems capable of uniting a notoriously fractious opposition behind a common vision for reform. Egypt, along with Algeria and Tunisia, will be facing succession struggles sooner rather than later. Meanwhile, internal tensions in Turkey seem to be rising, with the threat of escalation looming in the background. In other words, this is a difficult time of transition in the Middle East and the U.S. will need to do considerably more than just tread water.

The views expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

On Mideast Policy, We Can Walk and Chew Gum at the Same Time

Monday, April 19th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

A few publications over the past week continue to highlight the importance of democracy promotion in the Middle East. Some have done a better job than others.

First up is Jackson Diehl’s piece in today’s Washington Post. Diehl makes one excellent suggestion — then diminishes it with a faulty assumption. His premise is that the Obama administration fails to understand that diplomacy in the Middle East is inextricably linked to timing. Diehl believes current geopolitical conditions suggest the White House should push for a democratic opening in Egypt, with elections looming this year to replace an aging president, and former International Atomic Energy Agency chief Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei building a credible reform movement in the country.

But as a consequence, Diehl believes that the Obama administration should set aside the larger Israeli-Palestinian peace plan that the Obama administration is cooking up to focus on Egypt.

The former is an excellent initiative and should be pursued despite America’s tricky, decades-long relationship with Egypt that has centered far more on regional military hegemony and diplomatic stability than democracy promotion. But Diehl treats Middle East policy as a zero-sum game, with Israel-Palestine being thrown by the wayside. According to Diehl, rather than focusing on Egypt:

Obama has focused most of his personal energy and diplomatic capital on the Arab-Israeli conundrum — where, for a variety of reasons, there is no immediate opportunity. …[T]he big challenge for the president is to set aside his preconceived notions about what big thing he can or should accomplish in the region — and seize the opportunity that is actually before him.

I ran this by my friend Andrew Albertson, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy, and he dismissed the notion that we can’t walk and chew gum at the same time. In an email, he responded:

I certainly agree that the U.S. can and should be doing more in response to events in Egypt. Egyptians view this year as an opportunity to push for important political reforms in their country, and I think we need to support that. But no — I don’t think this is an either-or proposition. In fact, on the contrary, I think we will be more credible — and more effective — if we convey our support for the region’s people and basic issues of human dignity across the board.

The point is that both democracy and Egypt and big initiatives on Israel-Palestine are worthy endeavors. The former seizes on the opportunity available, and the latter attempts to create a bit of opportunity over the long run.

So how is the Obama administration doing on promoting democracy? Albertson’s POMED has just put out a new report by Stephen McInerney that takes a hard look at the Middle East democracy budget. McInerney finds that “total funding for democracy and governance is up” with important programs that promote Internet freedom, as well as aid to Afghanistan/Pakistan and Yemen, emphasized.

One of the big concerns, McInerney says, closely echoes Diehl’s original point:

Controversial changes in U.S. assistance to Egypt have been reinforced.• Funding for democracy in Egypt remains at levels sharply reduced in March 2009, which included disproportionate cuts in funding for civil society. The decision to provide USAID funding only to organizations registered and approved as NGOs by the Egyptian government remains in place. Finally, the administration is now exploring the establishment of an “endowment” proposed by the Egyptian government to remove congressional oversight over future U.S. economic aid.

By all means we should address these problems. But doing so need not come at the expense of other Mideast initiatives.