The following op-ed ran in today’s Cleveland Plain Dealer:
One homeland security item that jumps out in the president’s 2011 budget is $700 million to buy an additional 1,000 full-body scanners for airports. The decision underscores the new politics of security in the wake of the attempted Christmas Day bombing of a U.S.-bound Northwest Airlines flight.
The scanners will help for now, but it’s only a matter of time before a terrorist comes up with a way to get around them. A cheaper and more effective alternative exists — smart screening. And smart screening doesn’t take naked pictures of everyone trying to board a plane.
First, we have to understand the failings of the system. Following the bombing attempt, the intelligence community came under fire for failing to “connect the dots” that could have stopped Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. But that’s not right — there weren’t any dots to connect.
To be sure, “signs” existed that Abdulmutallab could pose a threat to American citizens. But “signs” are very different from “dots.” Signs are vague indicators of potential danger based on sources of unknown credibility, while dots are corroborated pieces of intelligence.
Think Abdulmutallab’s father’s visit to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria was a “dot”? In hindsight, it sure looks like one, but it was a sign.
That’s because “walk-in” informants will nearly always be evaluated as noncredible sources of intelligence. Why? There are hundreds upon hundreds of walk-ins to American embassies worldwide every day. More than 99 percent are lying, confused or not knowledgeable about the issue at hand. Dedicating limited resources to verify every walk-in would severely hamper ongoing investigations involving other, more credible intelligence operations. Relatives, like the father, can be the worst transgressors. Can’t settle that intra-family dispute? Ratting out your kin to the Americans might make the problem vanish.
Then there was the NSA intercept about the Yemen-based al-Qaida affiliate using a “Nigerian” in an unspecified attack. Dot? Nope. Sign? Yes — but still a very vague one. Without specific details like the alleged attacker’s name, location or itinerary, there’s little an analyst can do aside from lump the information within the general threat environment. This is assuming, of course, that the intercepted callers aren’t speaking in code.
The bottom line? There is not — nor will there ever be — an analyst within the intelligence community who would have read a report of unknown credibility and concluded that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was an urgent priority, especially considering the many other confirmed bad guys under investigation.
It’s time to construct a security apparatus that intelligently accounts for signs of potentially dangerous passengers while balancing risk, passenger inconvenience and privacy concerns — and saves money in the process.
Rather than purchase enough body scanners to take naked pictures of everyone boarding a flight, the TSA and National Counter Terrorism Center should review one of the least discussed but potentially most effective devices it already has on the books: the “selectee” list.
This differs from the 4,000-person “no fly” list, whose members are permanently barred from flying. Those on the selectee list can fly, but only after additional on-site screening. The problem is that the screening generated by the current the selectee list is inefficient — the entry “Elizabeth Kennedy” gets all Elizabeth Kennedys searched every time, no matter their destination or threat environment.
It’s time to let the selectee list think for itself. With technological innovation, the list could be transformed into a “smart” anti-terrorism tool: Allegedly dangerous individuals would be added, but additional passenger screening is triggered only when an algorithm connects potential attackers to a suspect travel itinerary and during periods of elevated, if vague, threat levels. Individuals selected for additional screening must be shared with the airlines.
For example, if an allegedly dangerous Elizabeth Kennedy is set to travel from Dublin to the United States, her profile would trigger additional screening only when the list automatically connects her name, travel itinerary and an ongoing Ireland-based threat. If the threat is based out of, say, France, or once an analyst determines it has lapsed, she would undergo standard security procedures.
America’s security apparatus can’t become airtight against vague and unsubstantiated threats. When compared to the expense, invasive delay, and certain obsolescence of a full-body scanner, the “smart selectee list” is a winner. It costs less, protects privacy concerns, and reduces security wait-times by eliminating needless searches.
Read the column at the Cleveland Plain Dealer.
The “aught” decade that just ended was bracketed by 9/11, perpetrated by al-Qaeda terrorists who had enjoyed havens in Sudan and Afghanistan, and a thwarted Christmas 2009 airline bombing by a Nigerian terrorist, who learned his craft in Yemen. The years were filled with a running, halting effort to prevent the Taliban from re-taking the Afghanistan government. Throughout the millennial decade, a postmodern theme dominated: terrorists virtually taking over weak states that should have been eliminating them. Today, as we enter a shiny new decade, we should embrace a cozy and decidedly pre-modern tradition: the system of sovereign states that has served us well since the 17th century.
Christmas Day would-be bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was connected to a group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, often referred to as AQAP. Since that attempted attack, I’ve found a disturbing lack of clarity in the public debate about 