Regulating Tech in the Digital Age: Lessons from China


Regulating Tech in the Digital Age: Lessons from China

Wednesday, September 7, 2022

5:30 p.m. — 8:30 p.m.

Open Gov Hub

1100 13th St NW Suite 800, Washington, DC 20005

About this event

How is China approaching tech regulation? What should policymakers and regulators learn from China’s approach? And how should this impact the way the rest of the global community approaches China?

Join us for an expert panel discussion on tech regulation, geopolitics and globalism. Stay for a reception with light bites and beverages as we bring together the DC tech policy community with the Tony Blair Institute’s London, Singapore and San Francisco teams.

The Panel

Max Beverton-Palmer (Moderator) – Director, Internet Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Xiaomeng Lu – Director, Geo-technology at Eurasia Group

Matt Nguyen – Policy Lead, Internet Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Jordan Shapiro – Economic and Data Policy Analyst at Progressive Policy Institute

Prof. Jing Tsu – Professor at Yale University

 

RSVP here.

Shapiro for The Hill: New Digital Privacy Bills Won’t Protect Women Seeking Abortions

By Jordan Shapiro, Economic and Data Policy Analyst

 

Digital privacy laws are not ready for a post-Roe v. Wade future. New bills circulating on the Hill are an important step toward safeguarding Americans’ personal data, but they are not a panacea to protect women seeking an abortion or the friends and family members who might be supporting them, or even just know of their intentions.

It’s no secret that today, personal and health data about human preferences, location, characteristics and behavior are collected through phones, apps, websites, advertisements, internet sites and service providers; if a device is connected to the internet, it probably collects user data. These data are used to provide helpful information and services, but as the United States lacks universal digital privacy protections, firms are solely responsible for data privacy and security.

At the same time, law enforcement has wide latitude to purchase and request personal data from companies. They can obtain a court order about a particular crime and companies are obliged to provide information related to the crime, some companies have made special portals to more easily provide data. Even without a court order, law enforcement can purchase bulk data from data brokers about suspected crimes or general surveillance. These data can contain location information, internet searches queries, among other personal information. Companies can push back but with a court order or subpoena are obliged to comply with law enforcement.

Surveillance of this nature has historically enjoyed wide support as protection against terrorism and other societal harms. But the combination of prolific personal data collection and law enforcement surveillance are predicated on the assurance that data about everyday interactions and behaviors are not under scrutiny by law enforcement. The overturning of Roe v. Wade calls this trust into question.

Read the full piece in The Hill.

Digital Documents as a Tool for Inclusion

Photo identification is necessary for modern life. However, more than 21 million Americans do not possess valid ID, and those without home addresses cannot register for state driver’s licenses. Without that physical license, a person can’t get a job, receive aid or health care, vote, or represent themselves in court. Luckily, IDs aren’t the only way to prove identity. Those born in the US have official paper trails through birth certificates and social security cards. To lose these documents and to obtain new copies require paying a fee or appearing in court. How can legislators ensure documents are accessible and protected? The City of Austin Innovation Office’s LifeFiles initiative offers a unique and scalable approach to inclusive documents.

LifeFiles distinguishes itself from global digital ID programs in its decentralized administration and accessibility. In its initial prototype funded by Bloomberg, LifeFiles sought to help people experiencing homelessness gain autonomy over identity documents by creating an official, digital repository of documents like birth certificates. Using a web application, the program was designed for all levels of tech literacy and access: First, by making it accessible from any computer and second, by offering multi-modal sign in methods, password, biometrics, social attestation, or a security question to unlock the documents. Initial testing enabled official free notarization of uploaded documents using blockchain so the digital repository could be used in government settings like applying for a driver’s license or for food and social welfare benefits.

LifeFiles is open source and never collects user data. It uses a combination of blockchain and encryption to secure user documents. Blockchain technology creates an encrypted hash to ensure secure notarization. Then, public-private key infrastructure shares documents, giving an identity verifier the ability to check the blockchain ledger to guarantee authenticity. Decentralized identifier technology (DID) allows these official documents to be accessed via web browser without having a record of identifying information saved in that browser. Technological alternatives to LifeFiles without DID are less secure.

Though piloted as an inclusion tool, digital documents are universally advantageous. User-controlled release of identifying data and encryption make LifeFiles secure and private. The system may also lessen the paperwork burden for individuals and governments through official, centralized, digital storage of essential documents. LifeFiles researchers concluded the program may eventually lower the costs of administering IDs.

The city of Austin’s Chief Innovation Officer, Daniel Culotta, suggests the program could function nationally. Without further grant funding, LifeFiles halted its testing of prototype documents, but the code is still publicly available for replication and scaling. If the government administers the program, onboarding is as simple as volunteer-led document uploading clinics.

This pilot has potential to be adopted by many states and localities. Currently there are 47 states including Washington DC where digital notarization is legal. Eventually, widespread adoption of digitized records will save money, and digital copies of birth certificates at the time of birth will prevent the loss of important records later on, all with users’ autonomy over their identities.

LifeFiles is an open-source response to the difficulties citizens face when they lose important documents. If states fully support this approach, it could aid more than 20 million Americans in controlling their identity and accessing services.

 

Digital Privacy in America: How does the ADPPA fit into global privacy legislation?

Earlier this month, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators released a discussion draft of a federal digital privacy bill: the American Data Privacy and Protection Act. It has now moved out of committee and, if passed, would create new legal rights for all Americans regarding the collection, access, and security of their personal data.

This is not the only consumer privacy bill considered by Congress, and there may be others. As written, this bill would align the United States with other nations, such as the European Union, that have thus far set global standards for digital privacy. Introduced in 2018, the European Union’s digital privacy law filled an important gap in regulating consumer privacy. Four years on, the data revealing how the law interacts with innovation and whether it succeeds in its goal of protecting consumers is still unclear. This should give US lawmakers pause to potentially explore more creative solutions for digital privacy.

The Progressive Policy Institute released a comparative report providing a general framework for analyzing privacy legislation across three separate but interrelated layers: legal access, security, and innovation.

Legal access defines what rights individuals have to see, access, update, and delete their data. Security describes the technical responsibilities for protecting collected data. And the third level, innovation, addresses how the laws interact with economic growth.

How does the new bill fit into these layers?

1. Legal Rights

If passed, the ADPPA would codify a set of data collection and access rights for all Americans who share data with private companies. It’s important to note that ADPPA does not apply to government collection or storing of personal data. As noted in PPI’s report analyzing countries’ privacy legislation, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom put some controls on government use of data, but China did not.

ADPPA requires firms that collect consumer data to gain clear “affirmative express consent.” Consent for data disclosure is firmly rooted in the European Union’s landmark data protection law, the General Data Protection Regulation. It is typically solicited via checkboxes on web pages, and the bill requires clear, plain language description of data collection needs. Specifically highlighted in the bill is the right for consumers to opt-out of targeted advertising and a prohibition of targeted advertising to children.

Once the data is collected, ADPPA states that individuals have the right to access, correct, delete, and transfer data about themselves, with private companies; China and the European Union provide similar access rights to citizens. How to exercise these rights must be clearly stated in easy-to-read privacy policies.

Overall, the bill provides very similar data rights as other countries. 

2. Security

Global privacy laws typically address security as a principle and design feature, the U.S. bill follows this trend. Without being overly prescriptive, as digital security is highly technical and evolving, it directs data collectors to implement a risk-based approach depending on the level of sensitivity of the data collected. High-risk data includes biometric or genetic information, passport or social security numbers, and private communications like text messages or email.

In line with other data privacy laws around the world, ADPPA requires large data collectors to appoint a data protection officer and to first conduct a data protection impact assessment, which is a plan for data security and risk.

Additional security and privacy measures recommend data minimization (an essential pillar of the GDPR), or restricting data collection to specific uses and deleting data after use. Data minimization is important because if data is not collected or not stored, it can’t be improperly used or exposed. (they direct not recommend, and i write measures and only add one additional measure. Is this bill simply a copy of the GDPR, does it try to be the same thing in the American context. How it relates to the ADPPA discussion.)

3. Innovation

It’s challenging to predict how a privacy law like ADPPA will impact digital innovation. Crucially, a federal privacy law will provide clear guidance for online companies that serve Americans across multiple states. In the current system, where states are passing digital privacy laws only for their residents, a federal law would ease compliance burdens on firms.

Similar to the GDPR, the bill exempts researchers, journalists, and small data holders except for those who derive 50%of their revenue from data sales. However, it does not clarify whether research conducted by big firms for platform improvements or marketing is exempt. The bill’s right to opt-out of targeted advertising and data transfers, which include data sales, may negatively impact certain industries like advertising and data brokers. Additionally, the bill recommends a study for a universal opt-out portal, which could be an innovation, but also could bankrupt the industries that rely on that data.

These provisions have broad implications for the data economy and should be evaluated carefully. Notably missing from the bill are recommendations for studies of other privacy-preserving technologies or security technologies. To assess the full impacts on innovation it requests an economic impact study five years after the enactment of the Act.

Conclusion

This draft bill is the newest of many privacy bills to be considered by Congress. Many of its provisions mirror the GDPR, as many global privacy laws do, with a major exception that this law does not apply to government data collection.

A key point of consideration for American legislators as they consider this bill is that it replicates many statutes from the GDPR. Enacted in 2018, we still don’t yet know the full impact of regulations like the GDPR on long-term digital innovation or whether its consumer protections are effective, but more information is coming out all the time. A new study from the University of Oxford in 2022 found that small business profits were most affected by the GDPR regulation. A National Bureau of Economic Research study found that the GDPR decreased the number of apps on the Google Play app store and depressed new entrants into the app market. As of the writing of this post, this author found no data detailing the state of data breaches since the introduction of the GDPR.

It’s undoubted that consumers deserve enhanced transparency and protection of their personal data online. If ADPPA passes, it would provide new data collection and protection rights for Americans which is an essential step toward digital privacy. But remember that the United States has a unique and strong innovation culture that is not necessarily well-reflected in the GDPR and other similar global privacy legislation. Those approaches shouldn’t be the only model being considered by lawmakers to enhance digital privacy. Congress has the opportunity to use existing research and data on alternative privacy-protecting technologies and ideas to set new global standards.

To prepare for the future of the digital economy, we need to increase chip manufacturing

Congress has the opportunity to increase chip manufacturing in the United States through the United States Innovation and Competition Act from the Senate, or the America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology and Economic Strength (COMPETES) Act from the House. Unfortunately, a stalemate over semi-unrelated trade provisions in the bill are preventing its passage, delaying $52 billion in funding provisioned to increase production in the United States. Continued stalemate is bad news for the future of the American economy.

Computer chips, or semiconductors, live in almost every electronic device we use on a daily basis. They’re needed for cars, cellphones, medical equipment, and national security. The growing thirst for chips came to a head in 2021 and 2022, when a national shortage drove up the prices of cars and other essential electronics.

The United States is the main designer of semiconductor chips with almost 50% of global sales, according to the Department of Commerce. But designing the chip is not the same as actually building it. Despite the dominance of U.S. design, only one U.S.-owned semiconductor foundry, or factory, exists in the United States, run by Infineon in Minnesota. Surprisingly, the U.S. lost its once supreme position in semiconductors by not investing in semiconductor “fabs,” leading it to only produce 11% of global semiconductors in 2019. Instead, Taiwan is the global leader in semiconductor manufacturing with two of the largest semiconductor foundries in the world, UMC and TSMC.

Moreover, the U.S. has fallen behind in two distinct ways. U.S. companies have fallen behind in the cutting-edge technologies that are used to make the “advanced” chips that power smartphones and game consoles. TSMC and Samsung are the only general-use chip manufacturers that can produce the most advanced chips.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has also not invested in the facilities that make the “mainstream” chips that power, among other systems, speedometers or car brakes. Chips for cars, while easier to manufacture, are cheaper and have a lower profit compared to smartphone and computer chips, which are the state-of-the-art versions that drive innovation in computing capabilities.

Chipmaking requires a lot of investment, resources, and research and development to keep up with the needs of computing. The global chip shortage demonstrated the challenges for digital societies in keeping up with demand; the European Union passed The European Chips Act in February 2022 in response to the shortage.

Congressional leaders have been negotiating to discuss differences in the Senate and House bills, which are extensive. Provisions around issues, such as the denial of “de minimis” tariff waivers on small packages from China, eased filing of anti-dumping lawsuits such as those recently targeting solar panel imports, digital trade negotiating goals, energy and research, space, green energy, and more are the subjects of disagreement. In contrast, only one major provision separates the two chambers on chips: PAYGO, with the House in support and the Senate against the budget provision.

In light of the importance of chips for everyday life and for future innovations, resolving the single disagreement over chips is both more pragmatic and necessary to increase American competitiveness and security in this sector.

Why Digital Privacy Is So Complicated

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The exact definition of digital privacy is complex, imperfectly aligned with typical understandings of privacy in an analog context. Historically, the vast majority of human actions and interactions existed beyond the scope of surveillance. Today, it’s nearly impossible to go about our daily lives without digital tools that facilitate modern life, but also collect data about individuals. When this growing flood of data is linked to an individual it is called “personal identifying information” (PII), the centerpiece of the debate over digital privacy.

The discussion of digital privacy is complicated precisely because it operates on three distinct but interrelated levels. First, privacy’s social and legal dimensions depend on whether individuals, corporations, or governments are assumed to hold primary rights to personal data collected about those individuals. In Europe, for example, the individual holds primary rights over their data, while in China, the state takes precedence.

The second level of the privacy discussion addresses data use and the technical protection and security of personal information to safeguard it from unwanted intrusion or theft while allowing individuals transparent access to their data. These complicated technical issues arise no matter privacy’s social and legal structure.

The third level of the privacy debate deals with the economics of PII. How does the chosen privacy model interact with innovation and growth? And how can it be assured that individuals get the appropriate benefits from their data?

This paper will lay out the privacy models of the United States, Europe, and China, with smaller sections on the United Kingdom, Canada, and India. For each area, we will discuss the social and legal structure, the technical design of security and transparency, and the economic implications of privacy and innovation. This paper sets out a framework for PPI’s ongoing privacy work. It lays the groundwork for future discussions of privacy legislation in the United States.

DOWNLOAD AND READ THE FULL REPORT

 

Mobile IDs would serve American consumers better

How can we move the humble state driver’s license or ID card into the 21st century? Today, U.S. state licenses are the principal consumer ID for day-to-day purposes. They certify identity and age using anti-counterfeiting features and are used to verify driving, or non-driving, privileges.

However, they have two major flaws. First, showing identification cards reveals all personal information to the identifier. If the ID is scanned, personal information is then stored with the scanner. Second, current state IDs are only usable in-person, despite the trend of moving public and private services online. Estimates suggest that in 2022, Americans will be spending 60% of their time online often giving away personal information for every new site or transaction.

However, some states are using existing and well-tested technology to make their state ID cards more useful and more private at the same time without compromising security: digital ID.

Digital IDs are authorized digital copies of a physical card that, using encryption and secure hardware, verify identity without sharing personal details. They bring identity verification from the physical sphere to the digital one, filling a security gap online by offering verifiable, and private, identification for public sector benefits and services but also private transactions. In addition, digital ID programs can facilitate greater children’s privacy, by requiring age verification to access certain websites.

On the rise globally, Estonia, Canada, Germany, India, the U.K., and the European Union, among others, already use or have announced digital ID programs.

In the United States, which has no national ID, Arizona and Louisiana adopted programs where residents can digitize their state ID cards. Since its launch in 2016, a million Louisianans use the digital ID accessible from the state’s ID app. Arizona’s digital ID launched in 2022 in partnership with Apple and Google, too, announced a new mobile wallet with digital ID features at Google I/O 2022. Their program, rather than using a state-specific app, allows users to add their mobile ID directly to their smartphone mobile wallet; if Arizona’s model is successful, other states may follow. 

Naturally, there is consumer skepticism that a digital system could be as secure, or more secure, than a physical card. Tying immutable identity characteristics to government databases requires high levels of trust, security, and privacy.

India’s digital ID program has been infamously insecure, exposing the biometrics and unique identity number a million residents. Kenya’s digital identity program was halted by the Kenyan High Court, which ruled that enrolling all citizens in a biometric ID database was illegal without clear documentation of data privacy risk assessment and mitigation strategies. The United States, too, lacks universal privacy protections for citizens.

The U.S. case is different from other digital ID systems as the country has no national ID — the Louisiana and Arizona digital ID pilot do not propose that. In addition, REAL IDs, which are the current gold standard in the U.S. for secure, physical ID cards, are not linked to citizen biometrics or immutable characteristics apart from a photo compatible with facial recognition scans. These features help keep physical ID cards secure. The Louisiana and Arizona mobile ID systems do not capture any additional data that is not already captured by the state Department of Motor Vehicles. In the Arizona case, the digital copy is stored in a smartphone using mobile wallet technology. Personal information is not shared with the phone or service provider.

The digital ID system being implemented by Arizona is based on the same technology that allows consumers to add credit cards to their digital wallets for wireless payments. They require the use of a pin or biometric authentication, and due to dynamic encryption, which assigns a unique, random number to every transaction, are more secure and private than a traditional card. If a phone is lost, it can be remotely wiped, and users will still be able to use their physical credit or ID card. Digital state IDs, using this design, could be used in any situation where identity verification is required but need not be revealed, like traffic stops, in bars, with the TSA, and even in online shopping or website sign-up, all while keeping user identity secure.

ID cards are essential tools to verify access to services. In their current form, they require giving away personal information without giving users a way to securely identify themselves in a crucial modern space: online. Mobile IDs bridge this gap and, with appropriate security and privacy measures, can serve consumers more effectively than standard ID cards alone.

 

How do mobile wallets work?

Tech and Telecom Prices Still Resist the Inflationary Surge

When we look back on this period, a big inflation story will be the dog that didn’t bark. While prices for traditional goods like energy, food, and autos have skyrocketed, digital economy inflation has remained almost non-existent.

This relative lack of inflation in the tech, broadband and ecommerce worlds — including ecommerce margins — is a stunning phenomenon that deserves a lot more attention than it is getting. Why are these companies holding the line on inflation when old-line industries are bingeing on double-digit price increases?

One real possibility is that innovation and investment in the digital sector may have a dampening effect on inflation. Basic economics tells us that when tech and telecom companies spend tens of billions of dollars to create new capacity and deploy new technology, it’s going to be hard for anyone to raise prices, including themselves. PPI’s Investment Heroes report from last year showed that eight out of the top 10 companies in terms of domestic capital spending — Amazon, Verizon, AT&T, Alphabet, Intel, Facebook, Microsoft and Comcast — were in the tech, ecommerce, and broadband sectors. PPI has not yet done the most recent Investment Heroes report, but it’s clear that massive spending on information technology, 5G networks, and ecommerce fulfillment centers is holding down digital prices.

Let’s take a look at the data from the January 2022 Producer Price report, released February 15. Overall, this report show relatively high inflation, with final demand prices up 9.7% over the past year, and the prices of final demand less food and energy up 8.3% (the last line of the table below).

But in the middle of this price surge, tech and telecom prices showed relative small increases or even decreases. The table below compares pre-pandemic inflation (January 2019 to January 2020) with the most recent year (January 2021 to January 2022).

We see that in the latest year, the producer price of cable and other subscription programming, internet access services, and data processing and related services are all falling. The producer price of wireless communications is basically flat (we note that the consumer price of wireless is down by -0.5% over the past year, consistent with the picture painted by the producer price data).

Margins for electronic and mail order shopping services are rising at only a 1.1% rate (we’ll discuss these further below). Prices for advertising sales by internet publishers and web search portals are rising at a 3.5% pace, only slightly faster than the pre-pandemic inflation rate of 3.4%.  Relative to January 2015, prices for advertising sales by internet publishers and web search portals are down by 16.9%.*

The one major exception to the low inflation story is the producer price of computer and electronic product manufacturing, which did take a substantial jump, probably in part because of supply chain disruptions.

 

Tech and Telecom Producer Prices Show Very Little Inflation
(change in producer prices)
Jan19-Jan20 Jan21-Jan22
Cable and other subscription programming 2.8% -1.8%
Internet access services 0.5% -1.3%
Data processing and related services 3.0% -0.3%
Wireless telecommunications carriers 0.2% 0.1%
Information technology (IT) technical support and consulting services (partial) 1.4% 0.9%
Electronic and mail-order shopping services 1.4% 1.1%
Software publishers -0.9% 1.1%
Wired telecommunications carriers 2.4% 2.6%
Internet publishing and web search portals – advertising sales 3.4% 3.5%
Computer & electronic product mfg 1.3% 4.1%
Comparison: Final demand for goods and services less foods and energy 1.6% 8.3%

 

For retail industries, the BLS collects “margin” prices, which is the selling price of a good minus the acquisition price of the good.  A bigger margin indicates that the retailer is either getting a higher profit, or having to cover increased costs for labor, energy, and other inputs.

The chart below shows that in the year ending January 2022, overall retail margins rose by 11.3%, a big jump over their pre-pandemic rate of 1.7%. General merchandise store margins rose by 10.3%, while the margins of motor vehicle and parts dealers rose by almost 25%.

Note that this increases could reflect the higher cost of running brick-and-mortar establishments during a pandemic, or they could reflect higher profits. But what is clear is that ecommerce margins have barely rose in the year ending January 2022.

 

 

 

*I looked at long-term trends in internet and print advertising prices in a 2019 paper, “The Declining Cost of Advertising: Policy Implications.”

 

American Innovation Under Threat

Restrictive Legislation and Global Competition
SUMMARY

A package of antitrust legislation recently introduced in Congress aims to improve competition in the U.S. technology sector. The proposed provisions in these bills would limit digital platforms’ ability to integrate product features, promote new products, or even compete in new market segments.

We conclude that such restrictions will harm U.S. scientific and technological leadership, hurting U.S. competitiveness and living standards.

Antitrust regulations that reduces commercial scale and product scope weaken incentives for corporate research and undermine the ability to innovate.

We highlight how these limitations may affect American scientific and technological leadership in the world. We also consider the role of information technology firms in advancing U.S. technology, the foreign competition they face, and the fragile nature of the U.S. innovation ecosystem.

You can download and view the entire slide deck by visiting the Innovation Frontier Project’s website.

Innovation, Free Apps, and the App Store

Tech platforms should be judged on how well they foster consumer welfare, innovation, investment, productivity and job creation.  Sometimes these values will conflict with each other, but they provide a good framework for thinking about the benefits and costs of platforms that go beyond the usual antitrust issues.

From that perspective, a recent opinion piece in Wired levies a criticism of the current design of Apple’s App Store that is important, if true. The authors, the legal director of Public Knowledge and then executive director of the Coalition for App Fairness, argue that when “Apple demands 30 percent of developers’ revenue, it limits their freedom to offer novel and innovative customer experiences.” They go on to say that the “biggest loss” from the App Store “has nothing to do with developers and users who have to work around Apple’s restrictions—it’s those apps and services that don’t exist at all because app store rules make them impossible.”

However, this criticism—that the pricing structure of the App Store results in too little app innovation and too few apps–is an odd one. As of the end of 2020, the App Store stocked 1.8 million apps. According to marketing research firm Sensor Tower, 85 percent of those apps were “free” to users, in the sense developers did not charge for downloads or  collect in-app charges.

But note that these apps are “free” to developers as well, in the sense that Apple receives no other revenue other than the fee for the developer account ($99 per year for an individual account, with a waiver for nonprofits, accredited educational institutions and government entities that will distribute only free apps ). This pricing structure creates very low barriers to entry for new apps, spurring both innovation and competition.

Free apps are responsible for much of the consumer welfare, innovation, investment and job creation enabled by the App Store. For example, consider the banking apps which are offered by virtually every large and small bank today. Despite the large amounts of financial transactions flowing through these apps, they fall into the “free” category to both consumers and the banks. Banking apps were absolutely essential during the pandemic, enabling customers to do banking transactions including depositing checks, without having to go into branches.  Indeed, banks compete to see what new functions can be added to their apps to make them more useful for their customers.

Another growing category of free apps are designed to control and interact with connected devices–the “internet of things.”  These connected devices can be anything from electric bikes to power tools to automobiles to smart homes to agricultural sensors. The variety is nearly infinite, but one common characteristic is that their associated apps are directed toward innovation and making the connected device more useful.  These apps are often a key selling point for the product, with the customer getting them as part of the purchase rather than paying to download separately.

Free apps also run the gamut of nonprofit organizations, from innovative educational organizations such as Khan Academy to nonprofit health service providers such as Kaiser Permanente to churches and other religious organizations.  Donations can be made through these apps as well.

In an era of rampant ransomware and supply chain attacks, a free or nearly-free distribution channel that is carefully vetted for malware would seem to be a plus for innovative apps. Especially as the internet of things becomes more important, apps associated with connected devices will become the leading edge of innovation.  Despite what the authors of the Wired piece argue, the pricing structure of the App Store fosters rather than impedes innovation and creativity.

 

 

Why A Digital Advertising Services Tax Will Undercut the Small Business Recovery: The Maryland Case

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As of November 2020, employment in Maryland was down more than 4 percent compared to a year earlier. Small businesses are suffering. Nevertheless, the state’s revenues for the 2021 fiscal year are coming in better than expected in spring 2020, buoyed by federal stimulus and continued employment of white collar workers.

Under the circumstances, enacting a new tax that would be especially harmful to small businesses seems like a mistake. However, in spring 2020 Maryland state legislators approved a new tax on annual gross revenues derived from digital advertising services in Maryland, with the proceeds to be devoted to education. The bill, which broadly covered “advertisement services on a digital interface,” was vetoed in May 2020 by Governor Larry Hogan, with the veto potentially in line to be overridden by the state legislature in the session that began mid- January 2021.

In this paper we will explore the economics of digital advertising and the economics of a digital advertising services tax, with special attention to Maryland. We make four main points:

  • The price of digital advertising has fallen by 42 percent since 2010 across the United States. This decline has fueled a sharp reduction in ad spending as a share of GDP.
  • Our calculations suggest that the falling price of digital advertising is saving Maryland businesses and residents an estimated $1.2 billion to $2 billion per year, based on the size of the state’s economy.
  • Passing the digital advertising services tax is likely to reduce the cost benefits of digitaladvertising to Maryland businesses and residents. In particular, the tax will drive up the price of help-wanted ads in Maryland, making it harder to connect unemployed Maryland residents with local jobs. In addition, employers will rely less on public ads and more on personal connections with friends and family, disadvantaging less- connected groups such as minorities and immigrants.
  • Raising money for education is a worthwhile goal. But the appropriate source of funds are broad-based taxes such as sales tax or an income tax, rather than a narrow and distortionary tax on one small but vital segment of the economy. In addition, moving to a combined corporate income tax framework could help reduce income shifting and increase tax revenues.

 

THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL ADVERTISING

Before discussing the particulars of the Maryland digital advertising tax, we’ll consider the broader economics of digital advertising. Prior to the widespread use of the Internet, the legacy media–newspapers and local television and radio stations– had a near-stranglehold on local advertising. Newspapers, especially, used that market power to raise advertising rates, because local retailers and other businesses had no other good alternatives if they wanted to reach nearby consumers. According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average price of newspaper advertising tripled between 1980 and 2000, rising far faster than the overall consumer price level (which doubled over the same period).1

As a result, businesses had to pay increasingly large sums for consumer-oriented advertising in the pre-Internet days. For retailers, restaurants and other local businesses who wanted to reach new customers, there were few viable alternatives.

Equally important, local employers had to shell out for “help-wanted” ads in newspapers in order to find good workers. Newspapers could and did jack up the price of these employment ads because businesses—especially small businesses—had no other way to reach potential employees before the era of digital advertising.

When we look back to the era before digital advertising, it is stunning how newspapers used help-wanted advertising as a high-priced cash cow. Consider, for example, the price of help-wanted ads in the Washington Post before the widespread use of digital advertising. In 1980 the Washington Post charged potential employers $1.98 for a single line in an employmentclassified ad, placed a single time in a dailyedition.

By 1990 the price of that same single line in a Washington Post help-wanted ad had risen to $6.70, a 240 percent increase. The price increases continued for the next decade, with the price of a line in a help-wanted ad rising to $11.06 by 2000, another 65 percent gain, far exceeding the 34 percent increase of the consumer price index over the same period.2

These ads were expensive—running just one five-line help wanted ad for just one week in 2000 would cost around $85, without volume discounts and including the more expensive Sunday edition. Small businesses who did not have their own HR departments, especially, had no other choice except to pay big bucks to the newspapers in order to hire.

Employers got huge price relief as the Internet became more important. Rather than being forced to run high-priced ads in newspapers, they could shift their help-wanted ads to online portals such as Craigslist, Monster.com and Indeed.com, which were both much cheaper and much easier for jobseekers to search. For comparison, today a Craigslist job posting in the DC area—which gives employers a full paragraph to work rather than just five lines–costs $45 for 30 days (Baltimore is priced at $35 per ad).3

Since 2010, the overall price of digital advertising has fallen by 42 percent, according to the BLS. (That figure excludes print publishers such as newspapers.). By comparison, the price of newspaper advertising, both print and digital, is down by only 7 percent since 2010.

This drop in price for digital advertising has been a tremendous boon for businesses, especially small businesses like restaurants and retailers, who used to have a limited set of options for consumer advertising. Businesses of all typesnow find it much cheaper and easier to post help wanted ads and find qualified help.

On a macro level, businesses and consumersare benefiting from the lower cost of digitaladvertising. In 2019, advertising amounted to about 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). That’s down from 1.5 percent in 2000, and an average of about 1.3 percent in the 1991-2000 period.4

In other words, the shift to digital advertising has lowered ad spending by about 0.3-0.5 percent of GDP. This is money that goes directly into the pockets of businesses and consumers.

What about Maryland? According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Maryland’s state GDP was roughly $400 billion in 2019.5 Applyingnational figures, that suggests digital advertisingis saving Maryland businesses and consumers about $1.2-2.0 billion per year.

IMPACT OF DIGITAL ADVERTISING TAX

Keeping in mind the lower price of digital advertising, what economic impacts would we expect from the proposed digital advertising services tax? H.B. 732 proposed a new tax on the annual gross revenues derived from digital advertising services in Maryland. The tax rate would vary from 2.5 percent to 10 percent of the annual gross revenues derived from digital advertising services in Maryland, depending on a taxpayer’s global annual gross revenues. To be required to pay the tax, a taxpayer must have at least $100 million of global annual gross revenues and at least $1 million of annual gross revenues derived from digital advertising services in Maryland.

Note that this is a tax on gross receipts, a type of state tax that has been judged by economists as intrinsically problematic.6 Gross receipt taxes are exceptionally sensitive to market structure, since the tax can be theoretically applied at each stage of the advertising production and sales process, which could lead to double (or multiple) taxation. In this case, the Maryland tax authorities will have to determine the “real” seller of the digital advertisements, which in many cases is not obvious.

Note also that the legislation does not actually specify what it means for digital advertising services to be “in Maryland.” That task is left up to the state’s Comptroller. But it seems clear that at a time when users are increasingly concerned about privacy, the legislation will effectively force advertisers to identify the location of people who view or click on digital ads. That is a move in the wrong direction, and might even violate the laws of some states or countries where the digital advertising companies are headquartered.

Because the digital advertising services tax, as proposed, is a tax on gross receipts rather than income, it has the potential to badly hurt profit margins. Consider Yelp, for example, the well-known company whose mission is to connect consumers with local businesses. As reported in Yelp’s 2019 annual report, the company has global revenues of $1 billion, virtually all fromdigital advertising, and an after-tax profit marginof 4 percent. Since Maryland accounts for 2 percent of U.S. GDP, that suggests Yelp’s Maryland revenues are $20 million, well over the threshold for applying the 10 percent tax rate in the proposed legislation.

The implication is that the proposed digital advertising services tax could turn Yelp’s Maryland business into a money-losing proposition. That’s insane. Yelp’s only options would be to either withdraw from the Maryland market or significantly raise its advertising prices (which would be difficult to do in a competitive market).

Whether digital advertising companies raise their rates or withdraw from Maryland, it would be bad news for local businesses trying to recover from the pandemic recession, and bad news for consumers who would just be crawling out of their pandemic-induced depression. Using digital advertising, owners are able to reach customers, showcase products, even confirm they are still open. Raising the price of digital advertising and reducing its availability could help slow those recovery efforts.

Or consider the impact of the proposed tax on “help wanted” postings. Since these ads have to identify a location of the job, it will be easy to connect the receipts to Maryland. Clearly what will happen is that Craigslist and other job sites will likely put a surcharge on Maryland- based help-wanted ads to account for the digital advertising services tax. The implication is that advertising for a job in Maryland will be more expensive than it was prior to the tax. That may even put Maryland employers at a disadvantage in attracting talented workers.

At the margin, Maryland employers will reduce their purchases of digital help-wanted advertising. In that way, the introduction of a digital advertising services tax will slow down the rate of hiring in the state.

The other likely effect is that employers will rely more on personal networks such as friends and family to fill positions, rather than advertising on the open internet. This is bad news for groups that are less well-connected, such as low-income workers, minorities and immigrants.

THE NEED TO RAISE REVENUE

Some people argue that taxing advertising to pay for education is a good trade-off for society. After all, the benefits of education are undeniable, while advertising is annoying to many people.

But advertising does have the virtue of allowing consumers to uncover cheaper and better goods and services, and aiding jobseekers in finding better employment opportunities. Recent economic research has actually looked at the plusses and minuses of taxing or fining advertising and transferring the proceeds to low-income workers.7 Calibrating the model using real world numbers, they found that the “advertising equilibrium modeled is surprisingly close to being efficient.” The implication, at least from the initial research, is that taxing digital advertising doesn’t gain much.

What are the alternative sources of revenue for education in Maryland? There is now the possibility of additional state support packages from the federal government in 2021. And in terms of taxes, without delving deeply into details, economists believe that the best taxes are broad and non-distortionary. That would argue in favor of increasing the top tier of the Maryland income tax, now set at 5.75 percent for taxable income over $250,000, especially since many high-income individuals have done well during the pandemic recession. Such an increase would raise revenues without imposing large deadweight losses on the state economy.

On the corporate income side, one possibility is for Maryland to shift to a system of “combined filing” for state corporate income tax. That would treat a parent company and its subsidiaries as one entity for state income tax purposes, according to the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, “thereby helping prevent income shifting” and potentially raising money.8

By comparison, a tax on digital advertising would dampen the ability of Maryland businesses to reach out to customers precisely at the time when it is needed—coming out of the pandemic recession. Small Maryland businesses trying to regain their customers need as much access to digital advertising as possible. Putting a tax on digital advertising is like taxing the future—and that’s never a good idea.

How Apple’s Latest Move Could Boost the Post-Pandemic Recovery

Apple announced this morning that it is reducing its commission on paid apps and in-app purchases from 30% to 15% for qualified small businesses and independent developers. This move obviously has plenty of implications for competition policy and business models.

But from the perspective of macroeconomic recovery,  this commission reduction comes at just the right time to simulate post-pandemic job growth.

It’s important to remember that the App Economy has been a potent source of jobs ever since Apple opened the first App Store in July 2008. In a September 2020 research note, we estimated that from the App Store’s opening in July 2008 to the pre-pandemic economic peak in February 2020,  the App Economy generated a total of 2.4 million jobs. That’s relative to the 15 million nonfarm payroll jobs created by the whole U.S. economy over the same period. The implication is that an estimated 16% of net job growth since the creation of the App Store in July 2008 has come from the App Economy.

The App Economy gains have continued through the pandemic recession, with our research showing that App Economy employment rising by 12% from April 2019 to August 2020, despite the weak economy. Employment in the iOS ecosystem and the Android ecosystem, respectively, are up up 15% and 14%  from the April 2019 estimates. (Note that many App Economy jobs belong to both ecosystems).

The commission reduction will build on these long-term trends, stimulating hiring by the “long tail” of small app developers and startups. Apple’s announcement says that the reduced commission will apply to existing developers who made up to $1 million in 2020 for all of their apps, as well as developers new to the App Store. So if you are a small business that is earning $500,000 in the App Store, the commission reduction may very well tip the scale for bringing on a new app developer, an extra sales person, or both.

It’s difficult to quantity the effect of the commission cut, but it certainly will make small businesses more willing to take chances and expand even in an uncertain economic climate. Climbing out of the pandemic, any action that encourages small business hiring  is good news for the U.S. recovery.

 

 

Spur Digital Manufacturing in America

This piece is part of our Building American Resilience Series.

Resilience is the ability to react quickly to unexpected events. Market economies are inherently resilient because they are decentralized. But by outsourcing too much production to the rest of the world, the U.S. has traded much of its flexibility and resilience for somewhat lower short-run prices. Moreover, we’ve reduced our ability to deal with new sources of unexpected events, including climate change, pandemics, and wars.

Our inability to produce enough N95 masks for healthcare workers, months into the pandemic, is both astonishing and instructive. N95 masks are classic examples of what might be called “middle-tech”—the masks themselves are individually cheap to produce and have no moving parts or electronic components, but the machines to make the masks, including the special non-woven fabric that filters out tiny particles, are precise pieces of equipment that are expensive, time-consuming to build and mainly come from overseas. A resilient manufacturing sector has to have the know-how and the capabilities to build more machines if needed—and it may be that we no longer have enough of the suppliers with the necessary know-how and capabilities to increase our productive capacity in a crisis.

Government statistics clearly show our eroding manufacturing base. Twelve out of nineteen major manufacturing industries shrunk between 2007 and 2019. Over the same stretch, the non-oil goods trade deficit grew by 60% to record levels, showing the gap between what we produce and what we need, and how unprepared we are to deal with potential shocks.

That’s why we propose a “National Resilience Council” to lead a national push to stimulate local production, shorten supply chains, create high-wage factory jobs and make our manufacturing sector more resilient in crises. We have to harness our strength in tech to transform manufacturing for the 21st century. To be honest, we can’t and shouldn’t fight this battle on China’s ground of giant factories supported by government subsidies.

Instead, a resilient manufacturing recovery requires the fostering of flexible, local, distributed manufacturing—relatively small efficient factories that are spread around the country, using new technology, knitted together by manufacturing platforms that digitally route orders to the nearest or best supplier.

The National Resilience Council would be tasked with identifying those industries and capabilities that are strategic, in the sense of improving the ability of the economy to deal with shocks like pandemics, wars, and climate changes. These areas are likely to be underinvested by private sector companies, who quite naturally don’t have an incentive to tackle these sorts of large-scale risks. For example, no single company has an incentive to invest in improving N95 mask technology so that it is easier to scale up production, but the US government does. Or to harken back to an important historic example, the Defense Department’s original motivation for funding the research that led to packet switching and the Internet was to create a decentralized network that would be more survivable in case of nuclear attack.

Shorter, simpler supply chains also help with sustainable production. Long and complicated supply chains require more air and water transportation, generating more greenhouse gases. International shipping alone, especially container ships, accounts for about 2 percent of all carbon dioxide emissions, about the same as Germany. Beyond that, the more links in the supply chain, the more difficult it is for end producers to get a full picture of their carbon emissions.

Our initiative has four parts:

• First, we should double the National Science Foundation’s roughly $8 billion budget, with more of an emphasis on manufacturing-related areas such as materials sciences. That would still put it well below the roughly$40 billion going to the National Institutes for Health.

Such a doubling has been a consistent bi-partisan goal in the past, yet the U.S. has consistently fallen short. For the past two decades more than two-thirds of U.S. private and public R&D spending has gone to infotech and biosciences, while other areas of science and technology have received much less attention. It’s time to make up the shortfall.

• Second, the government can shore up the nation’s supplier base by providing $200 million in low-cost loans and grants to help small and medium manufacturers test and adopt new production technologies, including digital advances such as robotics and additive manufacturing. Even in a low-interest rate environment, capital is relatively scarce for companies that are too small to tap the bond market.

A somewhat similar initiative to provide loan guarantees for investment in innovative manufacturing technologies, authorized under the America COMPETES Act and supervised by the Commerce Department, never got off the ground because of excessively restrictive terms. Under our proposal, the loans and grants to small and medium companies would be tied to improving the resilience of the manufacturing base.

• Third, the National Resilience Council should sponsor a Manufacturing Regulatory Improvement Commission, along the lines that PPI has suggested in the past. We have no desire to roll back essential environmental and occupational health regulations. But we do want to consider whether rules governing manufacturing have become so restrictive as to unnecessarily force out jobs.

• Fourth, the federal government should take the lead to create a common “language” so that product designers, manufacturers, and suppliers can more easily work together online, just like DARPA helped create the basic structure of the Internet in the late 1960s. Just as a young person can write an app, put it online, and find users around the world, it should be possible to create a design for a new product and easily find potential local manufacturers.

The first two parts of our “National Resilience Council” initiative, which were laid out in our 2019 policy brief, “Jumpstart a New Generation of Manufacturing Entrepreneurs”, find echoes in Joe Biden’s excellent plan for boosting U.S. manufacturing. Key elements that we support include his proposals for bringing back critical supply chains to America, boosting worker training, increasing R&D investment, building up the Manufacturing Extension Partnership, and providing capital for small and medium manufacturers.

Biden’s “Buy America” initiative is understandable, given the stunning size of the trade deficit. But in the long run, improving resilience is more about improving America’s manufacturing capabilities than it is about restricting trade. Globalization and the development of new sources of supply, like India, can be a plus for resilience as long as we keep investing at home.

Moreover, one key word is essentially missing from Biden’s plan: Digital. His proposals make no mention of digital manufacturing, cloud computing, 3D printing, or all the other technologies that have the potential to create new business models for America’s factory sector.

The key is connectivity. Twenty-five years ago the rise of the Internet connected computers and made all sorts of new businesses possible, creating millions of jobs. Now it’s time to make even the smallest factory in Ohio or Michigan part of a larger manufacturing network that can compete on a level playing field with larger foreign competitors.

Some manufacturing networks or “platforms”, with names like Xometry and Fictiv, are already starting to sprout. Such platforms can make it easier for buyers to find domestic suppliers who have the necessary capabilities, and then to shift producers quickly when shocks hit or when it becomes necessary to lower carbon emissions. Such platforms can also give manufacturing startups access to immediate markets, make it easier for entrepreneurs to create well-paying factory jobs.

But this transformation of manufacturing is not happening fast enough to help American workers. The government has an important role to play leading the way to the Internet of Goods.

Can digitizing the food manufacturing industry boost living standards?

A version of this post originally appeared on Forbes.com

Can digitizing the food manufacturing industry help boost living standards? The short answer is yes, if we link food manufacturing into the Internet of Goods.

We’re used to thinking of food as cheap and getting cheaper. In 1947, spending on food—both in and out of the home—accounted for 27% of non-health personal spending. By 2000, the food budget share, omitting healthcare, had dropped to 14%.

This 50-year decline in the food budget share fueled American prosperity. With much less of their budgets going to food, middle-class households could afford to spend more on housing, cars, vacations, and all the other aspects of a good life.

But as Figure 1 shows, around 2000, something changed. The decline in the food budget share stopped. Indeed, household spending on food has inched up to close to 15% of non-health personal spending by 2017.

To put it another way, if the past trends had continued,  the food share of non-health spending would be only 10%.  Americans would have almost $500 billion more to spend in other areas.

What happened to the food industry? Groups such as the American Antitrust Institute point to consolidation in industries such as meat processing, which potentially has increased the market power of major players and their ability to raise prices.

Another factor boosting food costs may be greater attention to safety.  In particular the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) was signed into law by President Barack Obama on January 4, 2011. This legislation gives the FDA a new mandate to regulate food production and processing. Indeed, the necessary rules are still being implemented–for example, the FDA is currently asking for comments on a proposed guidance for “Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption.” Obviously  an important step given the current lettuce issue!

But perhaps most important, the food manufacturing industry has been in a deep and profound productivity slump in recent years. Measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), output per hour in food manufacturing has dropped by 8% since its peak in 2005 (Figure 2).

In response, the food manufacturing industry has been embracing digitization, but it’s a slow process. According to data from the BLS, the entire food manufacturing industry employed less than 1000 software developers and programmers as of May 2017, compared to 25,000 engineers and scientists.

Digitization will have a significant impact in several different areas of food manufacturing. First, it will become much easier to consistently track food from “farm to fork.”  As a result, food recalls will become easier and cheaper. (According to one count, there were 456 food recalls in 2017).

Second, digitization of the production process will help boost productivity and lower costs. This includes product development. For example, FlavorWiki is a startup that uses data analytics to quantify consumer taste perceptions, and potentially help companies develop new products.

Finally, and perhaps the most important, digitization allows the development of local production models for food, requiring food to be shipped much shorter distances. In Japan, for example, the world’s largest automated leaf-vegetable factory has just opened in a suburb of Kyoto. In the U.S., companies such as Iron Ox are developed autonomous and hydroponic production models.

Such vertical farms might be tied directly into ecommerce networks to handle local delivery direct to consumers, thus cutting out several layers of the distribution chain. The result would be lower prices, higher quality, and less pollution from shipping, These are some of the benefits of the Internet of Goods.

Indeed, digitization will enable the rethinking of the entire food production, manufacturing, and distribution chain, to the benefits of consumers. With any luck, Americans will once again find their food budget shares falling and their standard of living rising.

Why Progressives Need to Embrace Innovation: Amazon’s $15/hr minimum wage

Amazon just announced that it would raise the minimum hourly wage for all of its US workers to $15 per hour, including workers employed by temp agencies.  This is good news for Amazon’s workers, obviously.  But it’s also a sign that we’ve moved into a new era, where technology is driving rising real wages for everyone, not just the well-educated.

Ecommerce is proving to be a positive force for labor. For 30 years, retail workers struggled with a horrible status quo that suppressed any growth in retail wages and forced workers of color into the lowest paying retailing jobs. Between 1987 and 2017, real hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers in retail went up a grand total of 2%.

Amazon and other ecommerce sellers have decisively disrupted that horrible status quo, and created hundreds of thousands of better paying jobs. Even before the Amazon wage hike, PPI research found that ecommerce fulfillment centers typically pay 30% more than brick-and-mortar retail in the same area. Labor share in warehousing rose from 75.8% in 2007 to 83.2% in 2017, coinciding with the rapid growth of ecommerce fulfillment centers. Amazon’s latest move will only push the labor share up further.

These higher wages don’t make Amazon a philanthropic organization, anymore than Henry Ford was being benevolent when he boosted wages for workers in his factories in 1914. Ford needed to pay more to attract a competent workforce because his introduction of the assembly line boosted productivity, lowered prices, made cars affordable to the masses, and created an auto boom and an insatiable demand for skilled workers.

In the same way, Amazon and other ecommerce firms are using technology to transform the previously expensive process of getting products from manufacturers into the hands of consumers—what we call the “Internet of Goods.” These technological improvements have created benefits for both consumers and workers. For example, BLS data shows that real margins in the electronic shopping industry (NAICS 4541)—defined as prices received by retailers less their acquisition price of goods—have fallen by 13% since 2007. That means consumers are gaining from lower prices.

Progressives need to embrace innovation. It’s the only road to the best future for everyone.

The Digital Sector: Rising Labor Share, Falling Gross Margin

Summary: Based on new “digital economy” data from a recent BEA working paper, we calculate that the labor share of the digital sector has risen since 2007, while gross margin of the digital sector has fallen over the same period. This result is consistent with strong competition in the digital product and labor markets (see the research note here).

In March 2018, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released a working paper called “Defining and Measuring the Digital Economy.[1] The working paper presented BEA’s initial work “to lay the foundation for a digital economy satellite account.”

The BEA authors focus on outlining their definition of the digital economy, and calculating its real growth and share of GDP. However, their data allows us to calculate two other policy-relevant measures of the digital economy: Labor share and gross margin.

 Labor share is a measure of how much of the income of an industry is going to workers. For the purposes of this paper, we define the labor share as compensation (COMP) divided by value-added (VA), expressed as a percentage. [2]

Gross margin is a measure of the profitability of an industry per unit of sales. In the business literature, gross margin is a company’s total sales revenue minus its cost of goods sold, divided by total sales revenue, expressed as a percentage.[3]

For our purposes, we define gross margin as an industry’s total gross output (GO), minus the cost of intermediate inputs (II) and labor compensation (COMP), divided by total gross output, expressed as a percentage.[4]

Based on this definition, labor share in the private sector has trended down since at least 1990 (Table 1). Similarly, private sector gross margin have trended up since at least 1990. Since 2007, private sector labor share has fallen by 0.8 percentage points, and private sector gross margin has risen by 1.9 percentage points.[5]

Table 1: Private Sector: Falling Labor Share, Rising Gross Margin
1990 2007 2016
Labor Share 52.2% 50.6% 49.8%
Gross Margin 26.0% 26.7% 28.6%
Data: BEA (as of April 2018)

 

Table 2: Digital Sector: Rising Labor Share, Falling Gross Margin
2007 2016
Labor Share 53.4% 55.4%
Gross Margin 28.4% 27.2%
Private sector industries only. Data: BEA working paper

The digital economy data from the BEA allows us to calculate the labor share and gross margin for the digital sector of the economy (Table 2). We see that labor share for private industries in the digital sector rose by 2 percentage points in the post-2007 “tech boom” period. Gross margin fell by 1.2 percentage points.

Figures 1 and 2  show the change in the labor share over time. Please note that this data was released prior to the July 2018 benchmark revision.

These results suggest that benefits of productivity growth in the digital sector since 2007 are being shared with workers and customers. This is consistent with strong competition in the digital product and labor markets. By contrast, companies in the broader private sector are benefitting from lower labor share and higher gross margin, which suggest that market power is rising outside of the digital sector.

The PDF version of this research note are found here. The results in this note are drawn from a forthcoming PPI policy paper, “Taking Competition Policy Seriously.” 

 

Definition of Measures

Labor share = COMP/VA

Gross margin = (VA-COMP)/GO = (GO- II-COMP)/GO

VA = value-added

COMP = labor compensation

GO = Gross output

II= Intermediate inputs

 

[1] Kevin Barefoot, Dave Curtis, William Jolliff, Jessica R. Nicholson, Robert Omohundro. “Defining and Measuring the Digital Economy,” March 2018. https://www.bea.gov/digital-economy/_pdf/defining-and-measuring-the-digital-economy.pdf

[2] Several alternative measures of the labor share all have the same general trend.

[3] https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/grossmargin.asp#ixzz5No688Apd

[4] The numerator includes profit-type income, such as profits, rents, and interest. It also includes taxes on production and imports that are chargeable to business expenses, such as state and local sales and property taxes, and a hodgepodge of state, local, and federal excise taxes.

[5] All data in this note is prior to the July 2018 benchmark revision. We focus only on private industries.